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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Background 
 
Introduction 
Mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers indicate a situation where independently 
owned firms join under the same ownership (Shy, 1995). In a basic sense, they describe a 
combination of two companies and refer to the purchase (or sale) of a company, in whole 
or in part. The US Federal Trade Commission classified mergers and acquisitions into 
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate based on the competitive relationships between the 
merging parties. A horizontal merger occurs when two companies in the same industry 
merge, indicating that the two companies are direct competitors prior to the merger. On 
the other hand, a vertical merger occurs when two companies that have a potential buyer-
seller relationship. Finally, a conglomerate merger occurs when firms in different lines of 
business merge under the same ownership, indicating that the two firms have no evident 
relationship before the merger. Conglomerate mergers are further classified into three 
categories; product extension, market extension, and other conglomerate. A production 
extension merger occurs when a firm producing one product acquires a firm that makes a 
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different product that requires the application of similar manufacturing or marketing 
techniques. On the contrary, a market extension merger occurs when acquiring and 
acquired firms produce the same product but sell the product in different geographic 
markets. This merger is also referred to as a geographic extension merger. Finance 
literature illustrates various reasons for corporate mergers and acquisitions. The ultimate 
goal of any merger or acquisition might be to create synergy by enhancing 
competitiveness through economies of scale and scope. In the next section, a historical 
overview and motives (or objectives) of corporate mergers and acquisitions are provided.  
 
Historical Overview 
The number and size of corporate mergers and acquisitions continue to increase at 
an exponential rate. According to Town (1992), the best characterization of mergers and 
acquisitions over time is that they occur in waves. Indeed, economic analysts have also 
stated that corporate mergers occur in waves. In other words, there are short periods of 
intense merger and acquisition activities of corporations. According to MERGERSTAT 
(2004), there are seven periods of intense merger and acquisition activities since the 20th 
century. They are as follows (MERGERSTAT, 2004, p.4); 
 
• 1893 – 1904: activity dominated by same industry consolidations of many small firms, 
resulting in monopolistic entities. Some believe the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
helped foster these horizontal mergers since the Sherman Act outlawed collusion, but not 
mergers. 
• 1915 – 1929: characterized by horizontal mergers of secondary firms, resulting in 
oligopolies, in which a few large firms dominated an industry. 
• 1940s: activity consisted of friendly acquisitions of many small, privately held businesses 
by large companies. Burdensome estate taxes forced smaller corporate owners to sell out. 
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• Mid-1950s – 1969: identified as the longest and largest merger and acquisition wave with 
the highest number of transactions. Conglomerate mergers were characterized by small 
and medium-sized companies acquiring other small and medium-sized firms in unrelated 
industries. The conglomerate merger wave was propelled by the theory of diversification, 
which held that the control of a variety of businesses would lessen the risk of business 
cycles. 
• Mid-1970s – 1980s: characterized by two main trends: takeovers of very large, public 
corporations and the divestiture of unrelated or unprofitable operations. As a result, the 
number of deals announced began to decline in the mid-1970s and in turn, the dollar 
value offered began to steadily increase. The 1980s ushered in a decade of megadeals 
with the overall acceptance of hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts and strategic 
megamergers. The introduction of the junk bond market made financing easier to obtain 
and allowed banks and brokerage firms to fund LBOs. 
• 1990s: driven by deregulation and consolidation, the banking, utilities, office supply, and 
health care industries have combined their operations to increase market share, achieve 
economies of scale and expand product offerings. This period has been characterized by 
megadeals creating dominant market players. The globalization of business has also been 
a catalyst for megadeals. 
• 2000-2003: the new millennium started with the M&A market at an all-time peak in 
dealflow. The market then steadily declined in 2001 and 2002, driven lower by the 
bursting of the Internet bubble, recession in the overall economy, corporate scandals, 
terrorist attack, and conflict with Iraq. After a slow start in 2003, the market turned the 
corner of the strength of private equity firms deploying more capital and buying more US 
companies than at any other time. By the end of 2003, the US M&A market saw a return 
of more strategic buyers, more megadeal announcements, and the first increase in the 
number of deals and in total deal value since 2000. 
 
It is notable that there have been recent increases in corporate mergers and 
acquisitions in terms of both number of announcements and dollar value. As seen in 
Figure 1-1, the number of announcements of worldwide mergers and acquisitions 
increased more than threefold between 1994 and 2000. Moreover, the dollar value of 
worldwide mergers and acquisitions increased nearly fivefold for the same time period. 
Even though the mergers and acquisitions market experienced a decline between 2001 
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and 2002 due to worldwide economic downturn, the market started to recover in the year 
of 2003. 
 
Figure 1-1. Trend in worldwide mergers and acquisitions 
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     Source: MERGERSTAT Review, 1988 and 2004 
 5
Table 1-1. Worldwide merger and acquisition announcements (1968 – 2003) 
Year Net announcement Total dollar value offered 
a 
($mil) Base 
b 
1968 4,462 43,609.0 1,514 
1969 6,107 23,710.9 2,300 
1970 5,152 16,414.9 1,671 
1971 4,608 12,619.3 1,707 
1972 4,801 16,680.5 1,930 
1973 4,040 16,664.5 1,574 
1974 2,861 12,465.6 995 
1975 2,297 11,796.4 848 
1976 2,276 20,029.5 998 
1977 2,224 21,937.1 1,032 
1978 2,106 34,180.4 1,071 
1979 2,128 43,535.1 1,047 
1980 1,889 44,345.7 890 
1981 2,395 82,617.6 1,126 
1982 2,346 53,754.5 930 
1983 2,533 73,080.5 1,077 
1984 2,543 122,223.7 1,084 
1985 3,001 179,767.5 1,320 
1986 3,336 173,136.9 1,468 
1987 2,032 163,686.3 972 
1988 2,258 246,875.1 1,149 
1989 2,366 221,085.1 1,092 
1990 2,074 108,151.7 856 
1991 1,877 71,163.8 722 
1992 2,574 96,688.3 950 
1993 2,663 176,399.6 1,081 
1994 2,997 226,670.8 1,348 
1995 3,510 356,016.4 1,735 
1996 5,848 494,962.1 2,658 
1997 7,800 657,062.6 3,013 
1998 7,809 1,191,861.1 3,091 
1999 9,278 1,425,884.8 3,384 
2000 9,566 1,325,734.4 3,757 
2001 8,290 699,398.4 2,997 
2002 7,303 440,701.0 2,839 
2003 7,983 504,596.2 2,927 
 
Source: MERGERSTAT Review, 1988 and 2004 
a: This column is based on base (b) which disclose dollar value. 
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The hospitality industry is not exempt from this gigantic merger wave of recent 
years. As a matter of fact, the industry has experienced noteworthy transformation in 
recent years resulting in fewer and larger hospitality companies. Specifically, there has 
been a sharp increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions since the 1990s. Figure 
1-2 and Table 1-2 present descriptive statistics of US hospitality firms’ mergers and 
acquisitions. Figure 1-2 plots the number of completed acquisitions in the US hotel and 
restaurant industries by year. As seen in Figure 1-2, hospitality firms’ merger and 
acquisition activities have been brisk in the recent past, especially in the late 1990s.  
 
Figure 1-2. Trend in US hospitality firms’ mergers and acquisitions 
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   Source: Securities Data Company (SDC) 
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Table 1-2. Completed mergers and acquisitions in the US hospitality industry 
Year Hotels (SIC code: 7011)a 
Restaurants 
(SIC code: 5812) a 
1980 0 4 
1981 15 15 
1982 14 22 
1983 42 47 
1984 38 56 
1985 29 28 
1986 31 38 
1987 43 42 
1988 66 46 
1989 53 55 
1990 49 58 
1991 43 51 
1992 37 54 
1993 78 77 
1994 119 78 
1995 132 93 
1996 227 141 
1997 284 140 
1998 204 118 
1999 106 92 
2000 77 89 
2001 46 62 
2002 60 42 
2003 87 63 
2004 89 68 
2005 182 70 
Source: Securities Data Company (SDC) 
 
In spite of the similarity of the mergers and acquisitions trends between the 
hospitality industry and the overall corporate mergers and acquisitions market, there is a 
noticeable difference between them. That is, the hospitality mergers and acquisition 
market moves faster than the overall mergers and acquisition market. The number of 
announcements and dollar value of mergers and acquisitions in the hospitality industry 
started to decrease in 1998, whereas the overall corporate mergers and acquisitions 
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market started to decrease in 2001. In addition, the mergers and acquisitions market in the 
hotel industry started to recover in 2002, whereas the overall corporate mergers and 
acquisitions market started to improve in 2003. This depicts that the hospitality industry 
is sensitive to the overall economic conditions and the merger and acquisition market of 
the hospitality industry reacts faster to economic changes than that of other industries.  
 
Motives of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are considered primary expansion and growth 
strategies nowadays. However, related studies have reported that mergers and 
acquisitions occur for a variety of reasons. Researchers have shown interests in why 
mergers and acquisitions occur. Particularly, Ansoff, Brandenburg, Portner, and 
Radosevich (1971) summarized motives for mergers by US manufacturing firms as 
follows: 1) a desire to limit competition or achieve monopoly profits, 2) a desire to utilize 
unutilized market power, 3) a response to shrinking opportunities for growth and/or profit 
in one’s own industry due to shrinking demand or excessive competition, 4) a desire to 
diversify to reduce the risks of business, 5) a desire to achieve a large enough size to 
realize and economical scale of production and/or distribution, 6) a desire to overcome 
critical lacks in one’s own company by acquiring the necessary complementary resources, 
patents, or factors of production, 7) a desire to achieve sufficient size to have efficient 
access to capital markets or inexpensive advertising, 8) a desire to utilize more fully 
particular resources or personnel controlled by the firm, with particular applicability to 
managerial skills, 9) a desire to displace an existing management, 10) a desire to utilize 
tax loopholes not available without merging, 11) a desire to reap the promotional or 
 9
speculative gains attendant upon new security issues, or changed price earnings rations, 
12) a desire of managers to create an image of themselves aggressive managers who 
recognize a good thing when they see it, and 13) a desire of managers to manager an 
ever-growing set of subordinates.  
Ikeda and Doi (1983) also documented seven common motives for corporate 
mergers and acquisitions. They were 1) increasing market share or market power, 2) 
increasing efficiency, especially realization of scale economies, 3) increase of research 
and development (R&D), 4) investment adjustment or avoidance of overlapping 
investment, 5) promotion of fundraising capacity, 6) firm growth, and 7) reducing risk of 
business. Further, they condensed the seven common merger motives into four broader 
categories; 1) increasing market share or market power, 2) increasing efficiency, 3) firm 
growth, and 4) increase of research and development.  
Trautwein (1990) took a theoretical approach to explain merger motives and 
provided seven theories of merger motives. They were efficiency theory, monopoly 
theory, raider theory, valuation theory, empire-building theory, process theory, and 
disturbance theory. According to Trautwein (1990), efficiency theory views mergers as 
being planned and executed to achieve net gains through synergies, monopoly theory 
argues mergers as being planned and executed to achieve market power, raider theory 
also views mergers as being planned and executed to transfer wealth from target’s 
shareholders to acquirer’s shareholders, valuation theory likewise views that mergers are 
planned and executed by managers who have better information about the target’s value 
than the stock market, empire-building theory argues that mergers are planned and 
executed by managers who thereby maximize their own utility instead of their 
 10
shareholders’ value, process theory, unlike the previously mentioned five merger motives, 
views mergers as an outcome of the strategic decision process, and finally disturbance 
theory views mergers as macroeconomic phenomenon and argues that merger waves are 
caused by economic disturbances.  
On the other hand, Walter and Barney (1990) conducted personal interviews with 
professionals in mergers and acquisitions and concluded that types of managerial 
objectives determined types of mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, they found five 
different objectives of corporate mergers and acquisitions using a cluster analysis. The 
five objectives in the study were; 1) mergers are a way managers obtain and exploit 
economies of scale and scope, 2) mergers are a way managers deal with critical and 
ongoing interdependencies with others in a firm’s environment, 3) mergers are a way 
managers expand current product lines and markets, 4) mergers are a way managers enter 
new business, and lastly 5) mergers are a way managers maximize and utilize financial 
capability.  
In a more recent study, Paulter (2003) summarized the most common merger and 
acquisition motives. By reviewing related literature, Paulter (2003) argued that corporate 
merger and acquisition activities are more than a simple business extension and classified 
merger motives into six categories; 1) efficiencies, 2) financial and tax benefits, 3) 
market power effects, 4) management greed, self-aggrandizement, or hubris, 5) obtaining 
a good buy, and 6) stakeholder expropriation. 
In the field of the hospitality industry, Kim and Olsen (1999) investigated 
important acquisition objectives in the lodging industry using the Delphi technique. The 
panel of the study indicated that the most important objective of acquisitions in the 
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lodging industry was to accelerate growth of the acquiring company followed by to 
acquire accretively to enhance stockholders’ value, to expand capacity at less cost than 
constructing new hotel properties, to capture scale economies to save costs through 
combining two firms within an industry, to utilize synergistic attributes of the acquired 
company with reference to the acquiring company, to broaden the acquiring company’s 
customer base by extending products and services (i.e., application of portfolio 
management, globalization), to improve credit capacity of resultant company, and to 
achieve the personal goals, vision, and particular objectives of the acquiring company’s 
chief executive. Corporate mergers and acquisitions are complicated business 
propositions and, as stated previously, there are various merger motives/objectives. 
However, those motives are not completely independent and separated. In most cases, 
more than one motive might be at work in corporate merger and acquisition activities.  
 
 
2. Research Motives and Objectives 
  
In the modern business environment, it is considered that corporate mergers and 
acquisitions are key growth strategies for any corporation. While aforementioned motives 
or objectives of corporation mergers and acquisitions are still held, merger waves after 
1990s were considered to be different from those in the past in terms of motives as well 
as objectives. Corporate merger and acquisition activities today are aiming at lower costs 
as well as new technologies, markets, skills, and even employees (Business Week, 1999). 
It is particularly true to a service company that the value of employees is being 
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capitalized through mergers and acquisitions. In this regard, Amihud and Lev (1981) 
argued that firms even pursued mergers and acquisitions to protect their human capital. 
Furthermore, Auster and Sirower (2002) argued that “even beyond the redistribution of 
billions of dollars of corporate assets and shareholder wealth, merger waves are important 
to understand because they reconfigure industries, fundamentally reshape corporate 
strategies, transform organizational cultures, and affect the livelihoods of employees (p. 
217).”  
Consequently, there has been a great deal of interest in corporate mergers and 
acquisitions in the finance literature. There are several topics related to corporate mergers 
and acquisitions. Some examples might be policy and regulation related to mergers and 
acquisitions (e.g., Clougherty, 2005; Morgan, 1997), relationship between innovation and 
acquisitions (e.g., Hudson, 1994; Man & Duysters, 2005; Morgan, 2001), successful 
mergers and acquisitions process (e.g., Quah & Young, 2005; Kim & Olsen, 1999), 
human resource management after the completion of mergers and acquisitions (e.g., 
Waring, 2005; Bryson, 2003; Huang & Kleiner, 2004; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993), 
motives/objectives of mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Walter & Barney, 1990;  Trautwein, 
1990; Kim & Olsen, 1999),  prediction of acquisition targets (e.g., Ragothaman, Naik, & 
Ramakrishnan, 2003; Akhigbe, Madura, & Whyte, 2004; Kim & Arbel, 1998), and post-
acquisition performance (e.g., Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Kwansa, 1994; Canina, 
2001).  
The steady increase of mergers and acquisitions in hospitality industry has 
aroused interest among investors, managers, and scholars. Accordingly, several studies 
have been conducted on corporate mergers and acquisitions in the hospitality industry. 
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For example, Hudson (1994) argued that innovation through acquisitions has become a 
major strategy in the restaurant industry. In addition, Kim and Olsen (1999) investigated 
determinants of successful corporate acquisitions in the US lodging industry. From a 
process perspective, they proposed a model which encompasses critical corporate 
acquisition issues in pre-acquisition management, post-acquisition integration, and post-
acquisition performance evaluation. Kim and Arbel (1998) investigated differentiating 
characteristics of acquisition targets using a logit model during the period 1980 to 1992. 
They found that firm size, asset valuation, growth-resources imbalance, and capital 
expenditure were significant variables in predicting merger targets of hospitality firms. 
On the other hand, Lafferty and Fossen (2001) described dynamics in horizontal and 
vertical integration in the hotel and airline industries. Furthermore, Oak and Andrew 
(2006) investigated if informed traders such as managers and financial analysts use 
information asymmetry regarding a hospitality firm’s valuation prior to an acquisition 
payment announcement. They found that informed traders utilize information asymmetry 
to maximize their private benefits. They also suggested evidence that market makers, 
who function as match makers between buyers and sellers, try to avoid losses against 
informed traders by imitating the informed trader’s trading patterns. However, there is 
still not much information available for hospitality firms’ merger and acquisition 
activities. 
Since maximization of a firm’s value is the utmost purpose and role of any 
management, a number of empirical studies have attempted to test if corporate mergers 
and acquisitions increase a firm’s overall value. As a matter of fact, a significant body of 
finance literature has tried to find out post-acquisition performances of firms in terms of 
 14
market-based performances (e.g., Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Gregory, 1997; Rau & 
Vermaelen, 1998; Raad, Ryan, & Sinkey, 1999; Canina, 2001; Kwansa, 1994), 
accounting-based performances (e.g., Ramaswamy & Waegelein, 2003; Dickerson, 
Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1997; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1989), and other performance 
measures (e.g., Avkiran, 1999; Brush, 1996; Ferrier & Valdmanis, 2004). While a 
number of empirical studies have attempted to investigate post-acquisition performances, 
the evidence is conflicting. It is clearly understood that the shareholders of acquired or 
target firms financially benefit from mergers and acquisitions. Yet, the financial returns 
for shareholders of acquiring firms are questionable. Mergers and acquisitions are 
carefully planned in an attempt to ensure financial success for both acquiring and 
acquired firms. Ironically, however, much of the empirical research to date on mergers 
and acquisitions has reported that acquiring firms commonly gain neutral to negative 
market reaction after mergers and acquisitions announcements (Connor & Geithman, 
1988). In general, the shareholders of acquiring firms financially benefit from merger and 
acquisition announcements on less than half of the occasions (Early, 2004).  
While there is significant body of research on post-acquisition performances, 
there is only a handful of studies concerning post-acquisition performances of hospitality 
companies. Nevertheless, empirical evidence from the studies is not consistent. Like 
studies on post-acquisition performances in other industries and across industries, studies 
on hospitality corporations’ post-acquisition performances agree that financial market 
value of acquired firms increased after mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Kwansa, 1994; 
Canina, 2001). However, it is contradictory whether the shareholders of acquiring firms 
benefit from mergers and acquisitions. Canina (2001) reported that merger and 
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acquisition events resulted in benefits to the shareholders of the acquiring companies. In 
contrast, Sheel and Nagpal (2000) and Hsu and Jang (2006) provided evidence that 
mergers and acquisitions did not result in gains for the shareholder of the acquiring 
hospitality companies.  
The past two decades have witnessed the largest merger and acquisition activities 
of hospitality companies in history. However, very little information regarding post-
acquisition performances has been available for the hospitality industry to help financial 
stakeholders within the industry. Considering the sharp increase in mergers and 
acquisitions in the hospitality industry for the past 20 years, it is timely to study the post-
acquisition performances of hospitality firms with newly available data.  
 
Problem Statement 
Although previous studies have expanded our knowledge of the post-acquisition 
performances in the hospitality industry, it remains uncertain if the shareholders of 
hospitality firms earned economic gains from mergers and acquisitions since the findings 
from the existing literature are contradictory. 
 
Research Objectives 
This study aims to investigate the post-acquisition performance of both acquiring 
and acquired companies in the hotel and restaurant industries. Related studies reported 
that the shareholders of acquired hospitality firms generally gained from mergers and 
acquisitions. Yet, it is questionable if the shareholders of acquiring hospitality firms 
gained from mergers and acquisitions because the findings are controversial. In 
 16
particular, this study is designed to investigate the stock market’s reaction surrounding 
merger and acquisition announcements using the event study method. In addition, prior 
studies showed that the post-acquisition performance of firms differed in terms of mode 
of acquisitions (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Canina, 2001; Loughran & Vijh, 1997) and 
payment methods (Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992). 
Therefore, this study considers mode of acquisitions (i.e., merger or tender offer) and 
payment methods (i.e., cash, stock, or mixed). Furthermore, prior post-acquisition studies 
also utilized accounting-based performance measures in order to investigate the effect of 
mergers and acquisitions on acquiring firms because they allow scholars to examine the 
acquiring firms’ performances directly. However, it takes long time before the 
accounting-based performance measures reflect the effect of mergers and acquisitions. 
Therefore, the current study investigates long-term performance of acquiring hospitality 
firms following mergers and acquisitions using accounting-based performance measures.  
 
Research Questions 
Based on the aforementioned objectives of the study, research questions of the 
current study are as follow:  
Research Question 1: Is the short-term financial performance of acquiring and 
acquired hospitality firms affected by merger and acquisition 
announcements? 
Research Question 2: Does the mode of merger (i.e., mergers and tender offers) 
affect the short-term financial performance of acquiring and acquired 
hospitality firms? 
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Research Question 3: Does the method of payment (i.e., cash, stock, and mixed 
payments) affect the short-term financial performance of acquiring and 
acquired hospitality firms? 
Research Question 4: Are there any significant differences between pre- and post-
acquisition accounting-based performances of acquiring hospitality firms? 
 
 
3. Significance of the Study 
 
The current research is an extension of post-acquisition financial performance 
research in the hospitality industry in that it incorporates newly available data. In 
addition, this study considers the relationship between the payment method and 
hospitality acquisitions since previous studies in finance literature revealed that post-
acquisition performance differed based on the method of payment and mode of mergers 
(e.g., Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992). Further, previous 
studies in the hospitality industry have primarily focused on the lodging industry. 
However, this study adopts the event study method to investigate post-acquisition 
financial performance in the restaurant industry as well as the lodging industry. Although 
a post-acquisition study with market-based data could provide useful information 
regarding a firm’s performance at and around acquisition announcements, the effect of 
mergers and acquisitions may appear slowly in the firm’s operational performance. 
Therefore, this study also includes accounting-based measures to investigate long-term 
impact of mergers and acquisitions on performance of acquiring hospitality firms. The 
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results of this study would provide useful information to both potential acquirers and 
targets for their merger-related decision makings. In addition, investors who are 
interested in the hospitality industry should benefit from the findings.  
Another important aspect of the current research is its contribution to the body of 
knowledge relative to post-acquisition performance in the hospitality industry. Although 
there is only limited research on post-acquisition financial performance in the industry, 
results from previous studies are mixed. Thus, it is expected that the findings of this study 
will provide a better understanding of short-term dynamics surrounding merger and 
acquisition announcements in the hotel and restaurant industries. Additionally, by 
incorporating long-term performance of acquiring hospitality firms with accounting-
based data, the findings will provide a better picture of merger and acquisition impact on 
the performance of acquiring hospitality companies.  
 
 
4. Organization of the Study 
 
This study consists of five chapters attempting to investigate post-acquisition 
performance of hospitality firms. The exposition of the present study is as follows. 
Chapter II is the literature review section. In this chapter, a literature review on post-
acquisition performance is presented. In particular, previous literature regarding post-
acquisition performance is summarized in terms of measures utilized in the studies 
including market-based measures, accounting-based measures, and other types of 
measures. Chapter III explains the research methodologies such as data collection and 
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analysis procedures used for the current study. Further, Chapter IV addresses the 
empirical results of this study. Lastly, Chapter V is the conclusion section. It discusses 
the implications and limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
There is a considerable body of research concerning post-acquisition performance 
in both acquiring and target companies. The goal of the present literature review is to 
identify relevant variables and methodologies of post-acquisition performance used in 
previous studies. Numerous studies have examined the post-acquisition performance to 
verify whether corporate mergers and acquisitions increased a firm’s value and/or 
operating efficiencies. Researchers (Yook, 2004; Dickerson, Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1997; 
Paulter, 2003; Cochran & Wood, 1984) have documented that there are two main streams 
in the existing post-acquisition performance literature. The fundamental difference 
between the two streams of research is the type of data used to measure the performance 
of firms. One is the stock market approach which uses stock market valuation to 
determine post-acquisition performance, and the other is the accounting data approach 
which directly focuses on a company’s profitability and other barometers such as 
efficiency and growth. While each of the two approaches has its advantages and 
disadvantages, it is true that the existing finance literature regarding post-acquisition 
performance reviewed is appropriately separated and classified into the two categories. In 
addition, researchers have operated other performance barometers such as operation-
based performance, even though they are not as frequently used as the stock market 
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approach or the accounting data approach. In this chapter, prior studies on post-
acquisition performances are summarized according to measures employed in their 
studies; market-based (i.e., stock market approach), accounting-based (i.e., accounting 
data approach), and other performance measures.  
 
 
1. Studies on Market-Based Post-Acquisition Performances 
 
The market-based performance measure is probably the most common measure 
utilized in studies concerning post-acquisition performances of firms (Sirower, 1997; 
Paulter, 2003; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Kwansa (1994) stated that “most of 
studies on acquisitions have concentrated on impact, especially in relation to increased 
shareholder wealth (p.17).” Even though there are critics against market-based 
performance measures such as failure in separating  a firm’s merger-related economic 
gains (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992), numerous studies have utilized it (e.g., 
Malatesta, 1983; Brown & Warner, 1985; Franks, Harris, & Titman, 1991; Agrawal, 
Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Kwansa, 1994; Gregory, 1997; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Rau 
& Vermaelen, 1998; Raad, Ryan, & Sinkey, 1999; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Canina, 
2001). The main reason for the preference of market-based performance measures is that 
the stock market is highly efficient and it incorporates newly available market 
information into the share prices of both the acquiring and target firms, implying that 
these measures represent the economic gains of mergers and acquisitions (Halpern, 1983; 
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Dickerson, Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1997). Indeed, Elton and Gruber (1984) insisted that 
strong market efficiency implies that stock prices reflect all available information.  
Broadly speaking, there are two categories in the existing finance literature 
involving market-based post-acquisition performance; short-term performance and long-
term performance. While there are more post-acquisition studies on short-term financial 
performance than long-term financial performance, the event study approach is the most 
frequently observed analytic tool in both short-term and long-term post-acquisition 
performance studies. In short-term performance studies, the event study approach 
concerns the impact of merger and acquisition announcements on shareholders’ wealth of 
either or both acquirers and targets at and around the announcements. On the contrary, 
the event study approach used in the long-term performance studies interests financial 
performance of merged business units in the long run.  
 
Short-Term Financial Performance 
Stated previously, the event study approach is the most frequently used analytical 
tool in post-acquisition performance literature. Earlier studies on post-acquisition 
performance using the event study approach used the final date of approval by 
shareholders of target firms as the event day (e.g., Mandelker, 1974; Langetieg, 1978). 
Later, scholars started to use the announcement day instead of the effective date of 
merger as the event day because the stock market is efficient and, therefore, stock prices 
change following the announcements (Dodd & Ruback, 1977; Jensen & Ruback, 1983) 
and even right before the announcements (Kwansa, 1994).  
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The event study approach is one of the market-based performance measure 
approaches and assumes that the stock prices of both acquiring and acquired firms change 
rapidly at or around merger and acquisition announcements since the stock prices quickly 
reflect available information. The primary goal of this approach is to decide if the 
stockholders of either or both acquirers and targets earn abnormal returns because of the 
merger and acquisition announcements. Thus, the event study approach tracks the stock 
prices of acquirers and targets for a period of time around merger and acquisition 
announcements. In other words, it measures the response of the stock price performance 
against an estimate of expected (or normal) return based on prior performance. When the 
observed returns are statistically different from the expected returns, it is concluded that 
merger and acquisition announcements affect the value of firms. Particularly, the excess 
(or abnormal) returns are gained when the observed returns exceed the expected returns 
(Peterson, 1989). 
Most previous studies utilizing the event study approach relied on the market 
model proposed by Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) which is considered as a standard 
procedure in the event study approach (e.g., Chalk, 1988; Kwansa, 1994; Black, Fields, & 
Schweitzer, 1996; Sheel & Nagpal, 2000; DeLong, 2003; Delaney & Wamuziri, 2004; 
Hsu & Jang, 2006). The market model is based on the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) and utilizes the ordinary least square estimator. In addition, the market model 
considers both the past performance of the stock and the sensitivity to the overall market 
changes in the measurement of excess returns.  
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The standard specification of the market model is as follows: 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit,      (1) 
where, αi is the intercept, βi is the beta coefficient or slope, εit is the random error 
term or the residual portion, Rmt is the return of the market portfolio for day t, and 
Rit is the return of the ith stock for day t. 
 
The expected (or normal) return of the stock is written as: 
E(Rit) = αi + βiRmt,       (2) 
where, αi is the intercept, βi is the beta coefficient or slope, and Rit and Rmt are the 
returns on the ith stock and the market portfolio for day t, respectively. 
 
On the other hand, the abnormal returns are calculated based on the following 
equation: 
Ait = Rit – E(Rit)      (3)  
     = Rit – αi – βiRmt,   
where, Ait is the abnormal return for a given stock i for day t, Rit is the observed 
or actual return of stock i for day t, and E(Rit) is the estimated return of stock i for 
day t which is derived from the equation (2). 
 
Using the equation (3), the abnormal return for each event day is then averaged 
across all companies in the sample to calculate an overall average abnormal return based 
on the following equation: 
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ARt = N
Ait
N
i
∑
=1 ,       (4) 
where, ARt is the mean abnormal return for a portfolio of securities for day t and 
N is the number of companies in the sample. 
 
Finally, daily abnormal returns are summed over the event window period to 
obtain cumulative abnormal return (or residual) using the following formula: 
 CARt1t2 = ∑
=
2
1
t
tt
ARt       (5) 
where, CARt1t2 is the cumulative abnormal return, t1 is the is the first period in 
which the ARt are accumulated and t2 is the last period in which the ARt are 
accumulated. 
 
Since the daily abnormal return is the average of the difference between the actual 
returns and the expected returns, both daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
return should fluctuate around zero. Otherwise, it is concluded that the event (merger and 
acquisition announcements in this case) affected stock price valuations of the market 
(Peterson, 1989; Armitage, 1995; MacKinlay, 1997).  
The existing literature showed three different methodologies that are possible for 
computing firms’ abnormal returns (Matsusaka, 1993). A common method is cumulative 
abnormal return which is explained previously. This method reflects a rate (or 
percentage) return on equity. On the other hand, Malatesta (1983) adopted another way of 
measuring the stockholders return and utilized a dollar return instead of a rate return. 
Malatesta (1983) argued that a dollar return is superior to a rate return because the result 
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is firm-size sensitive when a rate return is used. For instance, if a large and a small firm 
experience a same amount of increase in value after mergers, the result would show that 
the small firm made a better merger. In this method, cumulative average return from the 
market model is weighted by the value of the firm based on the following equation:  
 CADR = VtARt
T
t
×∑
=1
,     (6) 
where, CADR is the cumulative abnormal dollar return and Vt is the firm’s value 
at the start of day t.  
 
In addition, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) scaled the changes in the stock 
value by the purchase price. However, Matsusaka (1993) pointed out the following: 
However, suppose a firm makes two acquisitions, on the costs $10 million and results in a $1 
million value increase and another that costs $ 100 million and increase value by $5 million. The 
investment measure rates the takeovers at 10% and 5%, respectively, but the latter adds more 
value and is a better acquisition for the stockholders. Because the change in the buyer’s value 
impounds the purchase price, it seems redundant to rescale by the purchase price (p.361).  
 
Even though there are variations in measuring abnormal returns, Matsusaka 
(1993) depicted that “all three measures generally tell the same story (p. 361).” 
The findings from studies adopting the event study methodology generally agree 
that shareholders of acquiring firms received neutral to negative economic gains and 
shareholders of acquired firms benefited from merger and acquisition transactions 
(Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Roll, 1986; Paulter, 2003). In the realm of hospitality 
research, few studies have utilized the event study approach in investigating post-
acquisition performance of hospitality firms.  
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In an earlier study, Kwansa (1994) investigated the amount of wealth created for 
the shareholders of target hotels surrounding merger and acquisition announcements 
using 18 hotel firms involved in mergers and acquisitions for the period of 1980 through 
1990 and an event window of 61 trading days. In the study, expected (or normal) returns 
were calculated from 200 days to 51 days prior to the announcements and cumulative 
abnormal residual was utilized as a performance measure. The findings revealed that the 
shareholders of the target hotels benefited from the acquisition announcements between 
1980 and 1990. Especially, the cumulative average residual (CAR) for the 18 target 
hotels increased approximately 400% between days -2 to +2 (from 7.63 to 28.63). Based 
on the findings, Kwansa (1994) concluded that the stock market is efficient in valuing 
hotel stocks.  
On the other hand, Canina (2001) investigated stock returns surrounding merger 
and acquisition announcements in the hotel and hotel real estate investment trust (REIT) 
industries using the event study approach. Her investigation covered stockholders of both 
acquiring and target companies including both public and private companies. As Canina 
(2001) documented, the study was an extension of Kwansa’s work (1994) by extending 
the sampling period and including acquiring hospitality firms. The findings showed 
extremely large abnormal returns (8.9%) for target companies on the announcement day. 
For the following day (+1), the abnormal returns for the target firms were also positive 
and significant (1.3%). For the acquiring firms, the results also showed significant 
positive abnormal returns (1.3%) on the announcement day. However, the abnormal 
returns for the acquiring firms on the following announcement day (+1) were negative 
and not significant (-0.2%). At the same time, the study examined mergers and tender 
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offers separately. “A tender offer is a publicly announced offer to buy shares at a fixed 
price from any who tenders their shares” (Canina, 2001, p.48) and it usually occurs when 
the bidding company already has a significant portion of stocks, whereas a merger 
requires the approval of both stockholders and the board of directors of the target firms. 
The results showed that “wealth gains ensuing from lodging-industry tender offers are 
significantly greater than those of mergers (p. 54).” Based on the findings, Canina (2001) 
concluded that the shareholders of both acquiring and target hospitality firms benefit 
from merger and acquisition announcements. Further, the author explained that the 
positive market reaction might be derived from “stockholders’ expectations regarding the 
effects of monopolistic market power, increased productive efficiency due to synergies, 
or increased efficiency due to the removal of inefficiencies (p.52).” 
Hsu and Jang (2006) also examined whether the stockholders of acquiring hotels 
gained financial returns from merger announcements using the event study method. They 
estimated normal returns for the shareholders of acquiring hotels using 200 days of stock 
trading (-250 days to -50 days) and calculated abnormal returns for an event window of 
11 trading days (-5 days to +5). The findings revealed that the shareholders of acquiring 
hotels earned no abnormal returns following merger and acquisition announcements.  
 
Long-Term financial performance 
Long-term financial performance of merged firms is another frequently studied 
topic in the literature of finance. Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) investigated post-
acquisition performance of 765 companies that were involved in merger and acquisition 
activities between 1955 and 1987. In computing a stock’s abnormal performance, they 
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used the following equation which was proposed by Dimson and Marsh (1986) and 
utilized in other studies (e.g., Lakonishok & Vermaelen, 1990):  
Ait  = Rit – Rst – (βi – βs) (Rmt – Rft) ,    (7) 
where Ait is the stock’s abnormal performance, Rit is the return on security i over 
month t, Rst is the equally weighted average return during month t on the control 
portfolio of all firms in the same size decile as firm i based on the market value of 
equity at the end of the previous year, βi and βs  are the beta of security i and the 
control group, respectively, (estimated using monthly data over months +1 to +60 
after the merger completion), Rmt is the return on the market index, and Rft is the 
risk-free rate in month t.  
 
The average abnormal return (ARt) over all stocks in month t is computed based 
on the equation (4) and the cumulative average abnormal return from event month t1 to t2 
is measured by equation (5). The model specifically aims to adjust firm size effect and 
changes in risk. The findings from the study by Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) 
showed that the firms merged between 1955 and 1987 lost approximately 10% in their 
value over the five years following the merger completion.  
In addition, Gregory (1997) recognized differences among various models of 
expected returns and investigated long-term post-acquisition performances of UK firms 
using three models: the CAPM, risk and size adjusted model by Dimson and Marsh 
(1986), and three-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1992; 1993; 1996). The 
results reported -11.18% to -17.06% of loss in value of acquiring UK firm’s two years 
after mergers and acquisitions, regardless of the model of expected returns used. Other 
 30
studies on long-term post-acquisition financial performance also reported decrease in the 
firm value (Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000).  
Particularly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) conducted a long-term post-acquisition 
financial performance study with 947 acquisitions during 1970-1989 and found a 
relationship between the post-acquisition returns for shareholders and the mode of 
acquisition and payment method. More specifically, they compared the stock returns of 
acquiring firms to those of matching firms. The results showed that the stock returns for 
acquiring companies were higher than matching companies when a tender offer was 
made and when cash was used for payment. 
 
In the hospitality industry, Sheel and Nagpal (2000) examined post-acquisition 
equity value performance for acquiring hospitality firms involved in mergers and 
acquisitions for the period of 1980-2000, which encompassed 21 hospitality firms. They 
utilized the Jensen Measure Model to calculate the long run abnormal equity value 
performance of the acquiring firms. “Under fairly reasonable condition, the Jensen 
Measure, which is the intercept from the regression of the excess return on the excess 
return of a benchmark portfolio (Frank, 1991) provides an appropriate measure of merger 
performance (Sheel & Nagpal, 2000, pp. 39-40).” In their study, monthly returns of 
acquiring firms after the final bid were converted to excess returns by subtracting the 
yield on one month US Treasury Bills. Then, the market returns were converted to excess 
market returns.  The following equations were used:  
 
 
 31
R’it = Rit –Rft,        (8) 
R’mt = Rmt –Rft,         (9) 
where R’it is the excess return for company i in month t, Rit is the equity holder 
return for company i in month t, Rft is the yield on one month US Treasury Bills, 
R’mt is the excess return on market index m in month t, Rmt is the return on market 
index m in month t, and t is the month relative to the announcement date (t = 0 is 
the announcement month). 
 
Next, the excess equity returns (R’it) was regressed on the excess market return 
(R’mt) in order to obtain the intercept using the following equation: 
R’it = αi + βiR’mt + εit,      (10) 
where, αi is the intercept for company i measuring abnormal performance, βi is the 
sensitivity coefficient of company i to market index, and εit is the random error 
with mean zero. 
 
Sheel and Nagpal (2000) used monthly return data for 36 months beginning the 
month after the final bid for the 21 acquiring firms and concluded that the equity value of 
acquiring hospitality firms from 1980 to 2000 had declined significantly. Following the 
methodology used by Sheel and Nagpal (2000), Hsu and Jang (2006) also investigated 
long-term market performance of acquiring hospitality industry during the period 1985 to 
2000. The findings indicated that the equity value of acquiring hospitality firms had 
decreased significantly for the 36 months following mergers and acquisitions, which were 
consistent with the findings of Sheel and Nagpal (2000). 
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Sheel and Nagpal (2000) further conducted an event study focusing on the long-
run impact of mergers and acquisitions on the shareholder’s value. They calculated 
normal return between the 36 months prior to announcements and 7 months prior to 
announcements. In addition, they utilized a long event window period compared to other 
studies related to hospitality firms (-6 month to +36 month). The results indicated the 
CAR increased slightly in the first month (from -17.99 to -16.86) although the amount 
was not significant, which, according to them, suggested the introduction of possible 
biases due to market speculation. However, the study also revealed that the acquiring 
hospitality firm’s equity values declined significantly (CAR of -176.67 at +36 month) in 
the long run, indicating that the shareholders of acquiring hospitality firms gained 
negative returns subsequent to mergers and acquisitions.  
 
While a significant body of finance research in the general business area has 
focused on examining the post-acquisition performance in terms of long-term and short-
term, only a few hospitality researchers have investigated post-acquisition financial 
performances. To date, studies on post-acquisition performance in the hospitality industry 
frequently used the event study approach and CAR, a percent return, was favorably 
employed as a performance measure. Based on the findings from prior studies, it is well 
understood that the stockholders of acquired firms in the hospitality industry earn 
financial gains from merger and acquisition announcements as do in other industries 
(Kwansa, 1994; Canina, 2001). Yet, whether the stockholders of the acquiring hospitality 
firms gain financial returns from merger and acquisition announcements remains much 
less certain. For instance, Canina (2001) reported that the shareholders of acquiring firms 
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in the hospitality industry gained small abnormal returns following merger and 
acquisition announcements. On the contrary, Hsu and Jang (2006) documented that the 
shareholders of acquiring hotels earned no abnormal returns after merger and acquisition 
announcements. Furthermore, Sheel and Nagpal (2000) argued that the shareholders of 
acquiring hospitality firms gained negative returns subsequent to merger and acquisition 
announcements. Table 2-1 summarizes studies using the event study approach in the 
hospitality industry. 
 
Table 2-1. Studies using the event study approach in the hospitality industry 
Author(s) Industry/focus (sample period, n) 
 [Estimation period], 
[Event window] (days) Findings 
Kwansa 
(1994) 
Hotel 
/targets 
(1980-1990, 18) 
 
[-200, -51], [-30, +30] Shareholders of target hotel 
companies benefited from 
acquisitions between 1980 and1990. 
The CAR for the target hotels 
increased approximately 400% 
between days -2 to +2 (from 7.63 to 
28.63). 
Sheel & 
Nagpal 
(2000) 
Hotel & REIT  
/acquirers 
(1980-2000, 21) 
[-36, -7] (months), 
[-6, +36] (months) 
A small positive insignificant 
abnormal return occurred in the first 
month (from CAR of -17.99 at 0 to 
CAR of -16.86 at +1). However, the 
acquiring firms’ equity values 
decreased significantly in the long 
run (CAR of -176.67 at +36). 
Canina (2001) Hotel & REIT 
/both acquirers and 
targets 
(1982-2000, 57) 
 
[-111, -12], [-1,+1] Although the gains are uneven, the 
shareholders of both the acquiring 
and target firms gain at the time of 
the merger announcement. In 
addition, wealth gains ensuing from 
tender offers are significantly 
greater than those of mergers. 
Hsu & Jang 
(2006) 
Hotel 
/acquirers 
(1985-2000, 17) 
[-250, -51], [-5,+5] The shareholders of acquiring hotels 
earned no abnormal returns 
following merger and acquisition 
announcements. 
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2. Studies on Accounting-Based Post-Acquisition Performances 
 
Financial information users have long been using accounting data in order to 
assess companies’ financial conditions. Unsurprisingly, the accounting-based measure is 
one of the popular measures utilized in studies related to corporate mergers and 
acquisitions. For example, a number of scholars have adopted accounting ratios in 
predicting takeover targets (e.g., Kim & Arbel, 1998; Meador, Madden, & Johnston, 
1986; Palepu, 1986). Furthermore, scholars have extensively used accounting information 
to analyze firms’ performances and also conducted post-acquisition performance studies 
with accounting-based measures in order to investigate the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on firms’ performances (e.g., Hsu & Jang, 2006; Chamberlain & Tennyson, 
1998; Dickerson, Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1997; Cornett & Tehranian, 1992; Healy, 
Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Ikeda & Doi, 1983).  
Researchers, who stand for accounting-based performance measures, argued that 
accounting-based performance measures are superior to market-based performance 
measures because they directly reflect a company’s performance more so than the 
market-based performance measures do (e.g., Grant, Jammine, & Thomas, 1988; 
Dickerson, Gibson, & Tsakalotos, 1997). In other words, they argued that market-based 
performance measures fail to indicate whether a firm truly achieves economic gains. 
Specifically, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) argued the following: 
There is near-unanimous agreement that target stockholders benefit from mergers, as evidenced by 
the premium they receive for selling their shares. The stock price studies of takeovers also indicate 
that bidders generally breakeven, and that the combined equity value of the bidding and target 
firms increases as a result of takeovers… But, researchers have had little success in relating the 
equity value gains to improvements in subsequent corporate performance… From the stock price 
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perspective, the anticipation of real economic gains is observationally equivalent to market 
mispricing… Stock price studies are also unable to provide evidence on the sources of any 
merger-related gains. (p.136) 
 
In an attempt to determine post-merger performances of Japanese manufacturing 
firms, Ikeda and Doi (1983) employed a variety of accounting-based performance 
measures. They utilized return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) as 
profitability measures, general and administrative expenses to sales ratio and sales to total 
assets ratio as efficiency measures, sales to employee ratio as a productivity measures, 
year-to-year change of sales as a firm growth measure, and R&D expenses and its ratio to 
sales as R&D measures. They conducted both three-year and five-year post-merger 
performance tests and findings suggested that mergers of Japanese manufacturing firms 
generally increased the performances, particularly in the five-year test.  
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) utilized both accounting-based and market-
based performance measures to determine post-acquisition performance for the 50 largest 
US mergers from 1979 to mid-1984. Distinctively, they relied on operating cash flow 
returns on market value of assets as a post-acquisition performance. They believed that 
cash flows represent the actual economic benefits generated by the assets. They used 
industry-adjusted cash flow returns and showed significant improvement in asset 
productivity as measured by operating cash flow returns for the 50 largest US merger and 
acquisition transactions between 1979 and mid-1984. They also found that there was a 
strong positive relationship between increases in operating cash flows and abnormal 
stock returns at merger announcements. 
Following the methodology of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992) compared the post-acquisition performance of 30 large bank 
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acquisitions with the pre-acquisition performance of the merging banks. Specifically, 
they identified seven indicators determining cash flow returns in the banking industry. 
The seven indicators were profitability (i.e., ROA and ROE), capital adequacy (i.e., 
capital to assets, loans to equity, and deposits to equity), credit quality (i.e., charge-offs to 
loans), efficiency (i.e., expenses to revenues, assets to employees, income to employees, 
and return on loans), liquidity risk (i.e., loans to assets and liquidity ratio), growth (i.e., 
asset growth rate), and interest-rate risk (i.e., net interest income to earning assets) 
indicators. They found out that, on average, the merged banks outperformed the banking 
industry. They explained that the outperformance was derived from the ability to attract 
loans and deposits, employee productivity, and asset growth. Additionally, they reported 
a positive relationship between abnormal stock returns surrounding merger 
announcements and their performance measures.  
Pilloff (1996) also investigated post-acquisition performance of merged banks 
with publicly traded banking institutions that were involved in merger activities between 
1982 and 1991. In the study, ROA and ROE were included as profitability measures. In 
addition, expenses to average assets, expenses to revenues, personnel costs to average 
assets, fixed assets expenses to average assets, and non-interest expenses to average 
assets were used as efficiency measures. For balance sheet measures, on the other hand, 
capital to assets, loan to assets, and deposits to assets were employed. The results 
revealed that both performance measures and consolidated abnormal returns show little to 
no change on average. 
Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalotos (1997) also examined post-acquisition 
performance for UK acquiring companies using accounting-based performance measures. 
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They studied a large panel of UK companies (n=613) between 1948 and 1977 using ROA 
as a profitability measure. They compared acquirers’ performances with their previous 
performances as well as with non-acquirers’ performances and found that acquisition had 
a negative impact on ROA of firms even when company-specific and time-specific 
effects were controlled. Further, they extended their examination by including firm size 
as measured by net assets, leverage as measured by debt to net assets ratio, and both 
internal and acquisition growth into their model and concluded that corporate mergers 
and acquisitions in the UK lead to a negative long-term effect on profitability.  
In the property-liability insurance industry, Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) 
examined whether financial and operating synergies were created in a sample of 72 
mergers that merged between 1980 and 1990 in relation to non-acquired firms of 
comparable characteristics. They stated that the objective of mergers and acquisitions is 
to create financial synergies through operating synergies. Even though they admitted that 
the two types of synergies were not completely distinct, they used two different groups of 
performance measures to investigate both financial and operating synergies. Solvency 
(i.e., surplus to total assets), liquidity (i.e., liquid assets to total assets), and leverage (i.e., 
premiums written to surplus and loss reserves to surplus) were used to measure financial 
synergies. To measure operating synergies, net income was used scaled by both 
premiums and assets. Their findings, in general, indicated that the performance of the 
merged firms was about as well as non-acquired firms indicating that financial synergies 
were not a strong motivator for mergers and acquisitions in the property-liability 
insurance industry. 
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Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) analyzed long-term post-merger performance 
using a pool of 162 publicly traded US firms that were involved in merger and 
acquisition transactions from 1975 to 1990. They took a similar methodology to that of 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and used industry-adjusted cash flow returns on 
market value of assets as a performance measure. They studied long-term post-merger 
performances of the combined firms while the focus was placed on: if post-merger 
performances of merged firms were comparable across acquisitions of different sizes, 
compensation plans, payment methods, industries, hostile acquisitions, and time. The 
results showed that post-merger performance was negatively associated with relative 
target size and positively associated with long-term incentive compensation plans, which 
indicated that mergers and acquisitions improved the combined firms’ performances as 
measured by industry-adjusted ROA. 
Among post-acquisition performance studies in the hospitality industry, Hsu and 
Jang (2006) investigated post-merger performance in the lodging industry from 1985 to 
2000 using a sample of 17 lodging firms. They employed both market-based and 
accounting-based measures of performance. For the accounting-based measure of 
performance, ROA and ROE were included in the study. The empirical findings from the 
study showed that ROA and ROE were significantly lower after mergers indicating that 
mergers and acquisitions in the lodging industry had a negative impact on the 
performance of firms. Additionally, they reported that mergers and acquisitions in the 
lodging industry had no significant impact on short-term equity value, while they had a 
negative impact on the lodging acquirers’ equity values in the long-term.  
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Table 2-2. Summary of studies on accounting-based post-acquisition performance  
Author(s) Industry (n) Performance measure Findings 
Ikeda & Doi 
(1983) 
Manufacturing 
(49) 
ROA 
ROE 
Expenses/sales 
Sales/assets 
Sales/employee 
Sales growth 
R&D expenses 
R&D expenses/sales 
Mergers generally increased the 
managerial performances of Japanese 
manufacturing firms concerned in a five-
year test, while the merger performances 
in a three-year test were inferior to those 
in the five-year test.  
Healy, Palepu 
& Ruback 
(1992) 
Various (50) ROA  The 50 largest US mergers between 1979 
and mid-1984 showed significant 
improvement in asset productivity as 
measured by operating cash flow returns. 
Also, there was a strong positive 
relationship between increases in 
operating cash flows and abnormal stock 
returns at merger announcements 
Cornett & 
Tehranian 
(1992) 
 
Banking (30) Cash flow ROA  
ROA 
ROE  
Capital/assets  
Loans/equity  
Deposits/equity  
Charge-offs/loans 
Expenses/revenues  
Assets/employees  
Income/employees  
Return on loans  
Loans/assets  
Liquidity ratio  
Asset growth rate  
Net interest 
income/earning assets 
Overall, the merged banks outperformed 
the banking industry in terms of 
performance measures. In addition, there 
was a positive relationship between 
abnormal stock returns surrounding 
merger announcements and the 
performance measures.  
Pilloff (1996) 
 
Banking (48) ROA 
ROE 
Expenses/average assets 
Expenses/revenues 
Personnel costs/average 
assets 
Fixed assets 
expenses/average assets 
Non-interest 
expenses/average assets 
Capital/assets 
Loans/assets 
Deposits/assets 
Performance measures showed little to 
no change after mergers and 
acquisitions.  
Dickerson, 
Gibson & 
Tsakalotos 
(1997)  
Various (613) ROA 
 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions in 
the UK lead to a negative long-term 
effect on performance as measured by 
ROA. 
 40
Chamberlain & 
Tennyson 
(1998) 
Property-
liability 
insurance (72) 
Solvency 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Net income/premiums 
Net income/assets 
Overall, the performance of the merged 
firms was about as well as non-acquired 
firms. 
Ramaswamy 
& Waegelein 
(2003) 
Various (162) ROA  Mergers and acquisitions improved the 
combined firms’ performances as 
measured by industry-adjusted ROA. 
Hsu & Jang 
(2006) 
Lodging (17) ROA 
ROE 
ROA and ROE were significantly lower 
for acquiring lodging firms after mergers 
and acquisitions. 
 
 
In summary, researchers have frequently utilized accounting-based performance 
measures in examining post-acquisition performance for both multi-industries (e.g., 
Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Ramaswamy & Waegelein, 2003) and specific industry 
(e.g., Chamberlain & Tennyson, 1998; Hsu & Jang, 2006), even though it is known that 
accounting-based performance measures have disadvantages such as inability to separate 
the effect of merger (Lubatkin, 1983) and the time lag between the merger and its impact 
on accounting data (Biggadike, 1979). The most frequently used accounting-based 
performance measures in the previous literature are ROA and ROE. Studies using 
accounting-based performance measures are interested in whether the merged firms 
actually increased their profitability and operating efficiencies after merger and 
acquisition transactions. As a result, the focus of this stream of research is the post-
acquisition performance of merged firms after transactions are completed. The findings, 
however, are not conclusive. For example, Ikeda and Doi (1983) and Ramaswamy and 
Waegelein (2003) reported increased performance following mergers and acquisitions. 
On the contrary, Pilloff (1996) and Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalotos (1997) concluded 
that mergers and acquisitions had little to no impact on performance. While there is 
abundant research on post-acquisition performance using accounting-based performance 
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measures, only one study, to the best of my knowledge, has been conducted in the field of 
the hospitality. Hsu and Jang (2006) investigated ROA and ROE of merged lodging firms 
and reported that ROA and ROE decreased significantly following mergers and 
acquisitions.  
 
 
3. Studies Using Other Performance Measures  
 
While the majority of the previous literature on post-acquisition performance has 
utilized either market-based or accounting-based performance measures, other types of 
performance measures have been adopted as well. Several studies employed accounting 
data in order to assess acquiring firms’ performances under the assumption that 
accounting data reflect firms’ performances originated from their operations (e.g., Hsu & 
Jang, 2006; Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; Feroz, Kim, & Raab, 2005). Yet, scholars 
have also utilized operation-based measures instead of using accounting-based measures 
as proxies of performance measures (e.g., Ferrier & Valdmanis, 2004). In this section, 
studies on post-acquisition performance using other types of performance measures (i.e., 
market share and operation-based measures) are illustrated.  
 
Market Share as a Performance Measure 
Camara and Renjen (2004) exemplified that the merged firm is more able to 
increase revenues and gain market share through synergies which are made possible by 
mergers and acquisitions than the firm could on its own. While the relationship between 
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corporate takeovers and market shares is often discussed in the subject of antitrust (e.g., 
Cameron & Glick, 1996), mergers and acquisitions are widely recognized as a fast way to 
increase market power through synergies hopefully created by combing two companies. 
Brush (1996) argued that “market share and change in market share are the only measures 
of business performance available at the level of disaggregation necessary for 
intraindustry analysis at the business level of the firm for all manufacturing industries 
(p.8).” Because market share is believed to be a long-term generator of future profits, 
scholars have utilized it in examining competitive performance of a firm (e.g., Buzzel, 
Gale, & Sultan, 1975; Stigler, 1958). Brush (1996) also argued that using market share as 
a performance is beneficial because it could be compared to other performance measures. 
Indeed, Buzzel, Gale, and Sultan (1975) investigated the relationship between market 
share and ROI and reported positive correlation between them. However, Woo (1987) 
pointed out one drawback of market share as a performance measure. That is, there could 
be a firm that has small market share but is highly profitable.  
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, Mueller (1985) conducted a large scale 
study on the relationship between mergers and market share. Particularly, the study 
investigated the impact of mergers on the market shares of the 1,000 largest companies 
from 1950 to 1972 by comparing market shares of acquired firms to those of non-
acquired firms in the same industry. The results revealed that firms merged between 1950 
and 1972 lost substantial market shares compared with non-acquirers. Additionally, Rose 
(1982) studied the effect of bank holding company affiliation on the market share 
performance of banks acquired from 1968 to 1978 and found out that banks with 
relatively small market share had increased the market share after acquisitions, whereas 
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the market share of banks with relatively large market share had decreased after 
acquisitions. Avkiran (1999) also conducted a post-acquisition performance study in the 
banking industry using market share. Especially, Avkiran (1999) utilized changes in a 
bank’s market share of deposits as a measure of performance. The findings from the 
study were mixed. Two merged banks out of four cases showed an increase in market 
share after mergers, whereas the other merged banks did not.  
On the other hand, Brush (1996) studied acquired companies between 1980 and 
1984 and concluded that the acquired business units could increase market share through 
operational synergies following mergers and acquisitions. In addition, Borenstein (1990) 
studied two mergers in the airline industry (i.e., Northwest/Republic airlines and Trans 
World/Ozark airlines) with regard to price changes, market shares, and changes in 
service. The findings showed that market shares of merged airline companies increased 
following acquisitions.  
 
Operation-Based Post-Acquisition Performance Measures 
As mentioned earlier, enhancing operational efficiencies is one commonly found 
merger objective in the literature. Not surprisingly, scholars investigated operational 
efficiencies of merged firms. There are several post-acquisition studies in the health care 
industry that utilized operation-based performance measures. For example, Sinay (1998) 
investigated the operating efficiencies of merged hospitals in comparison with controlled 
hospitals prior to, one, and two years after mergers focusing on cost reduction. Overall, 
the findings revealed that the merged hospitals successfully reduced costs following 
mergers indicating that mergers and acquisitions increased operating efficiencies through 
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scale and scope economies. In a more recent study regarding hospital mergers and 
acquisitions, Ferrier and Valdmanis (2004) investigated if mergers and acquisitions 
improved efficiency and productivity using operation-based measures such as number of 
beds, number of physicians, number of registered nurses, number of surgeries, and 
number of emergency room visits. They showed that the merged hospitals performed 
better when they were compared to hospitals that were not merged. However, they also 
revealed that the improvements in performancef were not sustained in the long run. 
Several post-acquisition performance studies have been conducted with operation-based 
measures and market share. However, no post-acquisition performance study with 
operation-based measure or market share, to the best of my knowledge, has been 
conducted in the hospitality industry.  
 
 
4. Summary of Literature Review  
 
Researchers have shown a great deal of interest on post-acquisition performances 
of firms. While the performance of a company can be measured by many criteria, market-
based and accounting-based measures remain the most frequently used measures in 
empirical studies. As the research on post-acquisition performance progressed, it became 
clear that acquirers, on average, gained non-positive (neutral to negative) returns as a 
result of acquisitions, whereas targets gained positive returns. There also have been 
attempts to explain this paradox. While several attribute this paradox to overpayment of 
bidding firms for target firms (Barney, 1988, Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 1991), several blamed methodological issues (Yook, 2004; Mitchell & Stafford, 
2000). Lubatkin (1983) suggested possible answers for this paradox: 1) administrative 
problems may accompany merger and cancel out the benefits of mergers, 2) 
methodological problems have prevented the empirically based studies from detecting the 
benefits, and 3) only certain types of merger strategies benefit the stockholders of the 
acquiring firm. Furthermore, previous studies also reported other variables affecting post-
acquisition performance of firms such as mode of acquisitions (merger or tender offer: 
Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Agrawal, 
Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992) and payment methods (cash or stock: Loughran & Vijh, 1997; 
Martin, 1996).  
In the field of the hospitality, only a few studies have been conducted to 
investigate post-acquisition performance. The literature review suggests that the event 
study approach is the most frequently used methodology in the industry and findings 
showed that the shareholders of acquired hospitality firms did gain economic returns 
subsequent to mergers and acquisitions. However, it remains uncertain if the shareholders 
of acquiring hospitality firms earned economic gains from mergers and acquisitions since 
the findings from the existing literature are contradictory.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
1. Data Collection 
 
This study utilizes the secondary data extracted from SDC, CRSP (Center for 
Research in Security Prices), and Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. The data for 
the current study was collected based on the following procedure.  
 
1. Completed merger and acquisition transactions for the hotel (SIC code 
of 7011) and restaurant (SIC code of 5812) industries from 1980 to 
2004 were retrieved from SDC database in which either acquirer’s or 
target’s SIC code was 7011 (for the hotel industry) or 5812 (for the 
restaurant industry).  
2. Deals with small amount of transaction value were dropped out from 
the initial list. For the hotel industry, deals less than $20 million were 
eliminated. In addition, deals less than $10 million were removed from 
the list for the restaurant industry.  
3. Then, only hospitality companies that were listed in National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System 
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(NASDAQ), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) were included. Further, companies were retained 
only when they were included in the CRSP database so that the 
researcher could obtain daily closing stock prices.  
4. Several hospitality firms have made multiple mergers and acquisitions 
for the sampling period. When a company was involved in multiple 
mergers and acquisitions within three years, the largest deals were 
retained. However, if a company made multiple mergers and 
acquisitions over three years, each transaction was treated 
independently.  
 
The above procedure led to 91 hotel companies (38 acquirers and 53 targets) and 
159 restaurant companies (79 acquirers and 80 targets). Furthermore, the companies were 
classified into subsets based on merger mode and payment method in each industry (see 
Table 3-1).  
Additionally, the accounting-based measures were collected from Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat database. Only acquiring companies that have available data at least 
for three years of pre- and post-acquisition period were retained. As a result, a total of 14 
acquiring companies were used to investigate long-term accounting-based performance 
of acquiring hospitality firms. 
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Table 3-1. The number of companies included in the study 
Hotel industry (n=91) 
Merger mode Payment method 
 
Merger Tender offer Cash Stock Mixed 
Acquirer (n=38) 36 2 13 8 17 
Target (n=53) 39 14 22 5 26 
All 75 16 35 13 43 
Restaurant industry (n=159) 
Merger mode Payment method 
 
Merger Tender offer Cash Stock Mixed 
Acquirer (n=79) 72 7 40 18 21 
Target (n=80) 52 28 53 10 17 
All 124 35 93 28 38 
 
 
2. Computation of Abnormal Returns 
 
 
Since isolating the effect of mergers and acquisitions on stock prices is difficult, 
an important methodological consideration concern is how long the event window should 
be. Although using a long event window might be appropriate to determine the extent of 
the economic implications of acquisitions, it is possible that it may not truly isolate the 
effect of acquisition announcements. On the other hand, using a shorter event window 
might isolate the effect of announcements on the stock prices. However, it may not be 
helpful to assess the stock market’s overall reaction to the announcements because it 
takes longer than three to five days surrounding the announcements for investors to 
correctly evaluate the events. It seems that previous studies on short-term post-acquisition 
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financial performance in the hospitality industry made arbitrary judgments on time period 
for normal return computations and the length of the event windows. For the computation 
of normal/expected returns, previous studies included 100 to 200 trading days ending 
prior to 12 to 51 days of the acquisition announcements. In addition, they utilized [-1, +1] 
to [-30, +30] days of event windows. That is 3 to 61 trading days of event windows. 
In this study, normal or expected returns for both acquiring and acquired 
companies were estimated using the equation (2) with adjusted daily closing stock prices 
of 150 trading days, ending 51 days before the merger and acquisition announcements [-
200, -51] because the public might hint the announcements even prior to the 
announcements (Kwansa, 1994; Hsu & Jang, 2001). In doing so, S&P 500 composite 
index is utilized as the return of the market portfolio following Hsu and Jang (2001). 
Next, abnormal or unexpected returns for each company were computed using the 
equation (3). Then, the abnormal returns for each event day were averaged across all 
companies using the equation (4). Finally, the averaged returns were accumulated for 
each day over the entire event period to produce CAR using the equation (5). In this 
study, the event window for measuring each stock’s abnormal returns is the common 10 
days before and 10 days after the announcements. Thus, the length of the event window 
is 21 trading days and, from the equation (5), CAR-= ∑
−=
10
10t
ARt . Figure 3-1 represents the 
time line for this study. 
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Figure 3-1. The time line of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to determine whether ARt was significantly different from zero, a t-test 
was employed. Prior to conducting the t-test, the aggregate of pre-event standard 
deviation of abnormal returns across all securities should be computed (Kritzman, 1994). 
The following equation is the formula for estimating the standard deviation of daily 
abnormal returns during the estimation period (from -200 days to -51 days): 
σi,pre = 1
)(
51
200
2
−
−∑−
−
n
ARARt pre
,     (11) 
 
where, σi,pre is the standard deviation of abnormal returns of security i estimated 
from the pre-event estimation period, ARpre is the average of returns of security i 
estimated from the estimation period, and n is number of days in the estimation 
period (i.e., 150 days). 
 
The standard deviations, as formulated above, are aggregated by squaring the 
standard deviation of each security’s return estimated during the estimation period, 
  -200         -51  -10      0        +10   (days) 
Pre-event  
estimation period  Event window 
Announcement 
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summing these values across all securities, dividing it by the number of securities, and 
taking the square root of the value:  
 
σN,pre = N
N
i
prei∑
=1
,
2σ
,      (12) 
where, σN,pre is the aggregate of the pre-event standard deviations of abnormal 
returns across all securities and N is the number of securities in the sample. 
 
Next, the t-statistics for ARt and CARt are as follows: 
ARt t-stat = 
preN
ARt
,σ       (13) 
 
 
3. Accounting-Based Measures 
 
Apart from short-term financial performance at and around merger and 
acquisition announcements, this study also aims to investigate long-term performance of 
acquiring hospitality firms with accounting-based measures. More specifically, this study 
compares the post-acquisition performance of acquiring hospitality firms with the pre-
acquisition performance of the firms.  
ROA and ROE are the most frequently used accounting-based measures in 
previous post-acquisition studies (e.g., Pilloff, 1996; Ikeda & Doi, 1983; Cornett & 
Tehranian, 1992). In addition, the importance of cash flow in evaluating a firm’s 
performance is well recognized. In post-acquisition studies, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
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(1992) and Cornett and Tehranian (1992) utilized cash flow return as a performance 
measure. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) argued that cash flows represent the actual 
economic benefits generated by the assets. Thus, this study includes ROA, ROE, and 
operating cash flow to assets ratio as profitability measures. In addition, a ratio of sales to 
assets is included as an efficiency measure. Apart from increasing profitability and 
efficiency, enhancing a firm’s growth is a common merger motive. Hence, this study also 
examines the impact of mergers and acquisitions on a firm’s growth as measured by sales 
divided by the previous year value of sales.  
The accounting-based measures were collected from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat database. Only acquiring companies that have available data at least for three 
years of pre- and post-acquisition period were retained. As a result, a total of 14 acquiring 
companies (5 hotel firms and 9 restaurant firms) were retained. In terms of analytic 
technique, a dependent-sample (or paired) t-test was conducted in order to test if there 
were any differences between pre- and post-acquisition performances of acquiring 
hospitality firms. In addition, Wilcoxon ranks test, a non-parametric technique, was also 
utilized because several items were not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
at 5% significance level).   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS 
 
The goal of this study is to investigate the short-term post-acquisition financial 
performance in the hotel and restaurant industries surrounding merger and acquisition 
announcements. This study analyzes post-acquisition financial performance in the hotel 
and restaurant industries separately. Subsequently, this study analyses data for both 
acquirers and targets and for both mergers and tender offers separately. This study further 
analyses data for cash payment, stock payment, and mixed payment separately. 
Moreover, this study also investigates the long-term accounting-based performance of 
acquiring hospitality firms with accounting-based measures.  
There are two subsections in this chapter. The first section reports the impact of 
merger and acquisition announcements on the stock prices of both acquiring and acquired 
in the hotel and restaurant industries. Hotel companies (SIC code of 7011) and restaurant 
companies (SIC code of 5812) were analyzed separately. In addition, data was analyzed 
separately in terms of mode of merger (i.e., merger and tender offer) and method of 
payment (i.e., cash, stock, and mixed payments). The second section summarizes the 
results of long-term financial performance in the hospitality industry using accounting-
based measures. In this section, hotel and restaurant companies were analyzed separately. 
However, mode of merger (i.e., merger and tender offer) and method of payment were 
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not considered in the second section mainly due to the limited number of companies in 
the study.  
 
1. Financial Performance Surrounding Announcements 
 
Post-Acquisition Performance in the Hotel Industry 
The abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring hotel 
companies are presented in Table 4-1. The first section summarizes the results for the 
entire acquiring hotels of both mergers and tender offers. The second and third sections 
exhibit the results for mergers and tender offers, respectively.  
A series of t-tests for the AR did not find any statistical significance, which 
indicates that acquiring hotel companies neither gain nor lose from merger and 
acquisition announcements. Descriptively, however, the entire acquiring hotel companies 
generally experienced a little decrease in their wealth (CAR-10+10 = -17.05). When mergers 
and tender offers are treated separately, it is found that the shareholders of acquiring hotel 
firms experienced a little more deterioration in their stock prices in tender offers (CAR-
10
+10 = -20.31) than in mergers (CAR-10+10 = -16.87). However, the companies included in 
this study is largely skewed to merger cases (n=36). Thus, it is difficult to make 
meaningful inference due to the limited number of companies for tender offer cases 
(n=2).  
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Table 4-1. Abnormal returns for acquiring hotels and merger modes 
Total (n=38) Mergers (n=36) Tender offers (n= 2) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 -1.98 -0.24 -1.98 -2.07 -0.24 -2.07 -0.39 -0.41 -0.39
-9 0.45 0.05 -1.53 0.52 0.06 -1.55 -0.70 -0.72 -1.09
-8 -2.38 -0.28 -3.91 -2.46 -0.28 -4.02 -0.89 -0.92 -1.98
-7 0.26 0.03 -3.65 0.32 0.04 -3.70 -0.92 -0.94 -2.90
-6 -2.04 -0.24 -5.69 -2.10 -0.24 -5.80 -0.89 -0.92 -3.79
-5 0.54 0.06 -5.15 0.61 0.07 -5.18 -0.78 -0.80 -4.57
-4 -1.53 -0.18 -6.68 -1.56 -0.18 -6.75 -0.97 -1.00 -5.55
-3 -1.55 -0.18 -8.23 -1.59 -0.18 -8.34 -0.83 -0.85 -6.37
-2 0.55 0.06 -7.69 0.61 0.07 -7.72 -0.66 -0.68 -7.04
-1 0.80 0.10 -6.88 0.90 0.10 -6.82 -0.97 -1.00 -8.01
0 -1.67 -0.20 -8.55 -1.70 -0.20 -8.52 -1.14 -1.18 -9.15
1 -1.56 -0.19 -10.11 -1.59 -0.18 -10.11 -0.98 -1.01 -10.14
2 -1.18 -0.14 -11.30 -1.20 -0.14 -11.32 -0.81 -0.84 -10.95
3 -1.04 -0.12 -12.34 -1.06 -0.12 -12.38 -0.66 -0.68 -11.61
4 -1.31 -0.16 -13.65 -1.33 -0.15 -13.70 -0.99 -1.02 -12.60
5 -1.52 -0.18 -15.17 -1.55 -0.18 -15.25 -1.05 -1.09 -13.65
6 -1.49 -0.18 -16.66 -1.52 -0.18 -16.77 -1.10 -1.14 -14.76
7 0.93 0.11 -15.73 1.05 0.12 -15.72 -1.13 -1.16 -15.88
8 0.96 0.11 -14.77 1.09 0.13 -14.63 -1.49 -1.53 -17.37
9 -0.89 -0.11 -15.66 -0.85 -0.10 -15.48 -1.54 -1.59 -18.91
10 -1.39 -0.16 -17.05 -1.39 -0.16 -16.87 -1.40 -1.44 -20.31
 
Table 4-2 reports the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the 
target hotels for the event window period. Again, t-tests for the AR do not find any 
statistical significance. Overall, the descriptive statistics show that the shareholders of 
acquiring hotels gain positive returns (CAR-10+10 = 33.26) around acquisition 
announcements. This finding is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Kwansa, 1994; 
Canina, 2001). Additionally, mergers and tender offers were analyzed separately and the 
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returns were about the same in mergers (CAR-10+10 = 33.45) and in tender offers (CAR-10+10 
= 32.70).  
Further, the companies were classified into three subsets: cash, stock, and mixed 
payments. Companies were assigned to cash (or stock) payment when the payment was 
made with pure cash (or stock). On the other hand, companies were categorized to mixed 
payment when the payment was not made with pure cash or pure stock. Table 4-3 
presents the daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring hotel 
companies. The first section is the results for the entire acquiring hotels which is identical 
to the first column of Table 4-1. The second, third, and forth columns summarize results 
for cash payment, stock payment, and mixed payment, respectively. Descriptive statistics 
suggest that the wealth of acquiring hotels’ shareholders deteriorated the most when a 
stock payment is made. Acquiring hotels with stock payment have a CAR-10+10 = -61.17 
compared to a CAR-10+10 = -12.33 for cash payment. This finding, even though it was not 
significant, is consistent with Loughran and Vijh (1997).  
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Table 4-2. Abnormal returns for target hotels and merger modes 
Total (n=53) Mergers (n=39) Tender offers (n=14) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.44 0.13 0.44 -0.22 -0.03 -0.22
-9 0.61 0.13 0.88 0.86 0.26 1.31 -0.10 -0.01 -0.32
-8 -0.02 0.00 0.86 0.83 0.25 2.13 -2.38 -0.34 -2.70
-7 0.26 0.06 1.11 0.39 0.12 2.53 -0.13 -0.02 -2.83
-6 0.54 0.12 1.66 0.79 0.24 3.32 -0.16 -0.02 -2.98
-5 0.53 0.11 2.19 0.74 0.22 4.06 -0.04 -0.01 -3.02
-4 0.00 0.00 2.19 0.07 0.02 4.12 -0.17 -0.02 -3.19
-3 0.69 0.15 2.88 1.01 0.31 5.13 -0.20 -0.03 -3.39
-2 0.89 0.19 3.77 1.18 0.36 6.31 0.07 0.01 -3.32
-1 1.26 0.27 5.03 1.58 0.48 7.90 0.35 0.05 -2.97
0 2.29 0.50 7.32 2.20 0.67 10.10 2.53 0.36 -0.44
1 2.57 0.56 9.89 2.56 0.78 12.66 2.59 0.37 2.15
2 2.36 0.51 12.25 2.57 0.78 15.23 1.77 0.25 3.92
3 2.78 0.60 15.02 2.58 0.78 17.81 3.33 0.47 7.25
4 2.68 0.58 17.70 2.57 0.78 20.39 2.96 0.42 10.21
5 2.63 0.57 20.33 2.43 0.74 22.82 3.20 0.45 13.41
6 2.72 0.59 23.05 2.48 0.75 25.30 3.39 0.48 16.80
7 2.93 0.64 25.98 2.59 0.79 27.89 3.88 0.55 20.68
8 2.99 0.65 28.98 2.67 0.81 30.56 3.89 0.55 24.57
9 2.10 0.45 31.08 1.39 0.42 31.95 4.08 0.58 28.65
10 2.18 0.47 33.26 1.51 0.46 33.45 4.05 0.57 32.70
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Table 4-3. Abnormal returns for acquiring hotels and payment methods 
Total (n=38) Cash (n= 13) Stock (n=8) Mixed (n=17) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 -1.98 -0.24 -1.98 -3.30 -0.26 -3.30 -2.80 -0.65 -2.80 -0.59 -0.11 -0.59
-9 0.45 0.05 -1.53 3.83 0.30 0.54 -2.96 -0.69 -5.76 -0.52 -0.10 -1.11
-8 -2.38 -0.28 -3.91 -3.36 -0.27 -2.83 -3.03 -0.71 -8.80 -1.32 -0.25 -2.44
-7 0.26 0.03 -3.65 3.64 0.29 0.81 -2.72 -0.63 -11.51 -0.93 -0.18 -3.37
-6 -2.04 -0.24 -5.69 -3.24 -0.26 -2.42 -2.72 -0.63 -14.23 -0.80 -0.15 -4.17
-5 0.54 0.06 -5.15 3.59 0.28 1.16 -2.65 -0.62 -16.89 -0.29 -0.06 -4.46
-4 -1.53 -0.18 -6.68 -3.38 -0.27 -2.22 -2.94 -0.68 -19.83 0.55 0.10 -3.91
-3 -1.55 -0.18 -8.23 -3.40 -0.27 -5.62 -3.04 -0.71 -22.87 0.56 0.11 -3.35
-2 0.55 0.06 -7.69 3.40 0.27 -2.22 -3.00 -0.70 -25.87 0.04 0.01 -3.31
-1 0.80 0.10 -6.88 3.53 0.28 1.31 -3.22 -0.75 -29.09 0.61 0.12 -2.70
0 -1.67 -0.20 -8.55 -2.74 -0.22 -1.43 -3.77 -0.88 -32.86 0.14 0.03 -2.56
1 -1.56 -0.19 -10.11 -2.68 -0.21 -4.11 -2.89 -0.67 -35.75 -0.08 -0.01 -2.64
2 -1.18 -0.14 -11.30 -2.68 -0.21 -6.80 -2.58 -0.60 -38.32 0.62 0.12 -2.02
3 -1.04 -0.12 -12.34 -2.41 -0.19 -9.20 -2.74 -0.64 -41.06 0.80 0.15 -1.22
4 -1.31 -0.16 -13.65 -2.58 -0.20 -11.78 -2.84 -0.66 -43.90 0.38 0.07 -0.84
5 -1.52 -0.18 -15.17 -2.45 -0.19 -14.23 -2.75 -0.64 -46.65 -0.24 -0.04 -1.07
6 -1.49 -0.18 -16.66 -2.48 -0.20 -16.71 -2.98 -0.69 -49.63 -0.04 -0.01 -1.11
7 0.93 0.11 -15.73 4.42 0.35 -12.29 -2.88 -0.67 -52.51 0.06 0.01 -1.05
8 0.96 0.11 -14.77 4.40 0.35 -7.89 -2.75 -0.64 -55.26 0.07 0.01 -0.98
9 -0.89 -0.11 -15.66 -2.21 -0.17 -10.11 -2.78 -0.65 -58.03 1.01 0.19 0.03
10 -1.39 -0.16 -17.05 -2.22 -0.18 -12.33 -3.14 -0.73 -61.17 0.07 0.01 0.10
 
 Table 4-4 summarizes the short-term financial of target hotels and categorizes 
results by method of payment. As does for acquiring hotels, cash payment outperforms 
stock payment. There is even a bigger difference between stock and cash payments for 
target hotels (CAR-10+10 = -63.86 for stock payment and CAR-10+10 = 49.09 for cash 
payment). For the target hotels, on average, the stock market reacts favorably to the 
merger and acquisition announcements on and following the announcements when the 
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payment is pure cash (AR0 = 3.27) or mixed (AR0 = 2.34), but reacts negatively when the 
payment is pure stock (AR0 = -2.32). 
 
Table 4-4. Abnormal returns for target hotels and payment methods 
Total (n=53) Cash (n=22) Stock (n=5) Mixed (n=26) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 0.27 0.06 0.27 1.50 0.30 1.50 -7.20 -1.56 -7.20 0.66 0.16 0.66
-9 0.61 0.13 0.88 1.40 0.27 2.90 -3.81 -0.82 -11.00 0.79 0.19 1.45
-8 -0.02 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 2.90 -3.96 -0.86 -14.96 0.72 0.17 2.17
-7 0.26 0.06 1.11 1.46 0.29 4.36 -7.30 -1.58 -22.26 0.69 0.17 2.86
-6 0.54 0.12 1.66 1.38 0.27 5.74 -4.20 -0.91 -26.46 0.74 0.18 3.61
-5 0.53 0.11 2.19 1.30 0.25 7.04 -4.47 -0.97 -30.93 0.84 0.20 4.45
-4 0.00 0.00 2.19 -0.04 -0.01 7.00 -3.86 -0.84 -34.79 0.79 0.19 5.24
-3 0.69 0.15 2.88 1.50 0.29 8.50 -4.04 -0.88 -38.83 0.91 0.22 6.15
-2 0.89 0.19 3.77 1.67 0.33 10.17 -3.62 -0.78 -42.46 1.10 0.26 7.24
-1 1.26 0.27 5.03 2.04 0.40 12.21 -2.52 -0.55 -44.97 1.32 0.32 8.57
0 2.29 0.50 7.32 3.27 0.64 15.48 -2.32 -0.50 -47.29 2.34 0.56 10.91
1 2.57 0.56 9.89 3.62 0.71 19.10 -1.98 -0.43 -49.28 2.56 0.61 13.47
2 2.36 0.51 12.25 3.57 0.70 22.67 -1.65 -0.36 -50.93 2.11 0.51 15.58
3 2.78 0.60 15.02 3.65 0.72 26.31 -1.58 -0.34 -52.51 2.88 0.69 18.46
4 2.68 0.58 17.70 3.66 0.72 29.97 -1.74 -0.38 -54.25 2.70 0.65 21.15
5 2.63 0.57 20.33 3.61 0.71 33.58 -2.25 -0.49 -56.50 2.75 0.66 23.90
6 2.72 0.59 23.05 3.63 0.71 37.21 -1.92 -0.42 -58.42 2.83 0.68 26.74
7 2.93 0.64 25.98 3.94 0.77 41.16 -1.86 -0.40 -60.28 3.00 0.72 29.74
8 2.99 0.65 28.98 4.01 0.79 45.17 -1.32 -0.29 -61.61 2.96 0.71 32.69
9 2.10 0.45 31.08 1.89 0.37 47.06 -1.22 -0.26 -62.83 2.92 0.70 35.61
10 2.18 0.47 33.26 2.04 0.40 49.09 -1.03 -0.22 -63.86 2.92 0.70 38.53
 
Figure 4-1 and 4-2 represent the AR and CAR for acquiring and acquired hotel 
companies, respectively. As can be seen in Figure 4-1, the AR of acquiring hotel 
companies generally fluctuates around zero, except when the payment was made by pure 
stock. Accordingly, CARs do not move far away from zero. However, acquiring hotels 
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with stock payment experienced a steady decrease in stock prices over the event period. 
This implies that merger and acquisition announcements for the acquiring hotels are 
perceived quite negatively especially when the payment is made by stock.  
Like the AR of acquiring hotels, the AR of target hotels fluctuate around zero 
indicating that the shareholders of target hotels do not gain returns due to merger and 
acquisition announcements. However, descriptive statistics suggest that there is a small 
increase in AR after the announcement. Consequently, CARs show a small but steady 
increase since the announcement day. However, as Figure 4-2 suggests, merger and 
acquisition announcements are negatively absorbed by the stock market when they are 
paid by pure stock. 
  
 
 
 
 
 61
Figure 4-1. AR and CAR for acquiring hotels 
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Figure 4-2. AR and CAR for target hotels 
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Post-Acquisition Performance in the Restaurant Industry 
For the restaurant industry, the post-acquisition performance of acquiring 
restaurant firms is summarized in Table 4-5. It also shows the results for mergers and 
tender offers separately. The results of t-tests did not find any statistical significance for 
AR of acquiring restaurants. On the other hand, the descriptive statistics indicated small 
increases in the stock prices of acquiring restaurants (CAR-10+10 = 5.25). When mergers 
and tender offers were analyzed separately, CAR was higher in tender offers (CAR-10+10 = 
12.50) than in mergers (CAR-10+10 = 4.55).  
Additionally, Table 4-6 reports the post-acquisition performance of target 
restaurants. Likewise, descriptive statistics showed increase in the stock prices of target 
restaurants (CAR-10+10 = 53.64) even though ARs were not statistically significant. Also, 
CAR for the shareholders of target restaurants was higher in tender offers (CAR-10+10 = 
82.05) compared to mergers (CAR-10+10 = 38.34). Overall, it was found that the stock 
reacted favorably when a merger and acquisition transaction was tendered. This pattern is 
parallel with Canina (2001) and Loughran and Vijh(1997). 
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Table 4-5. Abnormal returns for acquiring restaurants and merger modes 
Total (n=79) Mergers (n=72) Tender offers (n=7) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 -0.27 -0.08 -0.27 -0.33 -0.09 -0.33 0.44 0.29 0.44 
-9 -0.59 -0.17 -0.86 -0.69 -0.19 -1.03 0.47 0.31 0.91 
-8 -0.01 0.00 -0.87 -0.05 -0.01 -1.08 0.38 0.25 1.29 
-7 0.23 0.07 -0.64 0.21 0.06 -0.87 0.41 0.26 1.70 
-6 -0.28 -0.08 -0.92 -0.34 -0.09 -1.21 0.34 0.22 2.04 
-5 0.13 0.04 -0.79 0.10 0.03 -1.11 0.46 0.30 2.49 
-4 0.06 0.02 -0.73 0.01 0.00 -1.10 0.56 0.36 3.05 
-3 -0.60 -0.17 -1.32 -0.71 -0.20 -1.81 0.61 0.40 3.67 
-2 -0.97 -0.28 -2.30 -1.12 -0.31 -2.93 0.60 0.39 4.27 
-1 -0.58 -0.17 -2.88 -0.70 -0.19 -3.63 0.57 0.37 4.83 
0 0.11 0.03 -2.76 0.07 0.02 -3.56 0.61 0.40 5.45 
1 0.98 0.28 -1.79 1.01 0.28 -2.55 0.59 0.39 6.04 
2 0.88 0.25 -0.91 0.91 0.25 -1.64 0.54 0.35 6.58 
3 0.39 0.11 -0.52 0.38 0.11 -1.25 0.46 0.30 7.04 
4 0.84 0.24 0.32 0.88 0.24 -0.38 0.44 0.29 7.48 
5 0.65 0.19 0.96 0.63 0.18 0.25 0.80 0.52 8.28 
6 0.99 0.29 1.95 1.00 0.28 1.25 0.92 0.60 9.20 
7 0.70 0.20 2.65 0.68 0.19 1.93 0.88 0.57 10.07 
8 0.87 0.25 3.52 0.88 0.24 2.81 0.73 0.48 10.81 
9 0.80 0.23 4.32 0.80 0.22 3.62 0.79 0.51 11.60 
10 0.93 0.27 5.25 0.93 0.26 4.55 0.91 0.59 12.50 
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Table 4-6. Abnormal returns for target restaurants and merger modes 
Total (n=80) Mergers (n=52) Tender offers (n=28) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 1.51 0.45 1.51 0.98 0.34 0.98 2.50 0.60 2.50
-9 1.37 0.41 2.88 0.75 0.26 1.72 2.54 0.61 5.03
-8 1.07 0.32 3.95 0.62 0.22 2.35 1.88 0.45 6.92
-7 1.26 0.37 5.21 0.93 0.33 3.28 1.86 0.45 8.78
-6 1.53 0.45 6.74 0.88 0.31 4.16 2.74 0.66 11.52
-5 1.77 0.52 8.51 1.17 0.41 5.33 2.89 0.70 14.41
-4 1.67 0.50 10.18 0.99 0.35 6.32 2.94 0.71 17.34
-3 1.65 0.49 11.83 0.89 0.31 7.22 3.05 0.74 20.40
-2 1.45 0.43 13.28 0.54 0.19 7.76 3.14 0.76 23.53
-1 1.94 0.58 15.22 1.26 0.44 9.02 3.21 0.78 26.74
0 3.07 0.91 18.30 2.17 0.76 11.19 4.75 1.15 31.49
1 3.70 1.10 21.99 2.71 0.94 13.90 5.53 1.33 37.02
2 3.74 1.11 25.73 2.78 0.97 16.68 5.53 1.34 42.55
3 3.76 1.11 29.49 2.82 0.98 19.50 5.50 1.33 48.05
4 3.77 1.12 33.27 2.86 0.99 22.36 5.47 1.32 53.53
5 3.34 0.99 36.60 2.87 1.00 25.22 4.21 1.02 57.74
6 3.76 1.12 40.37 2.78 0.97 28.01 5.59 1.35 63.33
7 3.35 0.99 43.72 2.79 0.97 30.80 4.39 1.06 67.72
8 3.47 1.03 47.19 2.52 0.88 33.32 5.22 1.26 72.94
9 3.00 0.89 50.19 2.79 0.97 36.11 3.40 0.82 76.34
10 3.45 1.02 53.64 2.23 0.78 38.34 5.71 1.38 82.05
 
Next, the method of payment was also considered in the restaurant industry and 
the results are shown in Table 4-7 and Table 4-8. Table 4-7 summarizes the daily 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring restaurant firms. For the 
acquiring companies, the stock market reacted favorably to the merger and acquisition 
announcements on and following the announcements when the payment was pure cash 
(AR0 = 0.77) or mixed (AR0 = 0.04), but reacted negatively when the payment was pure 
stock (AR0 = -1.24). As a result, the CAR for acquiring restaurants are positive when 
 66
deals were cash payment (CAR-10+10 = 12.74) and mixed payment (CAR-10+10 = 9.83). On 
the contrary, the stock payment shows a negative CAR (CAR10+10 =-16.72). 
 
Table 4-7. Abnormal returns for acquiring restaurants and payment methods 
Total (n=79) Cash (n=40) Stock (n= 18) Mixed (n=21) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 -0.27 -0.08 -0.27 0.61 0.24 0.61 -0.63 -0.14 -0.63 -1.62 -0.40 -1.62
-9 -0.59 -0.17 -0.86 0.66 0.25 1.27 -2.99 -0.69 -3.62 -0.91 -0.23 -2.53
-8 -0.01 0.00 -0.87 0.67 0.26 1.94 -0.60 -0.14 -4.22 -0.82 -0.20 -3.35
-7 0.23 0.07 -0.64 0.67 0.26 2.61 -0.47 -0.11 -4.69 -0.02 0.00 -3.36
-6 -0.28 -0.08 -0.92 0.09 0.04 2.71 -0.24 -0.05 -4.92 -1.03 -0.25 -4.39
-5 0.13 0.04 -0.79 0.68 0.26 3.38 -0.67 -0.15 -5.60 -0.23 -0.06 -4.62
-4 0.06 0.02 -0.73 0.66 0.25 4.04 -1.09 -0.25 -6.68 -0.10 -0.02 -4.71
-3 -0.60 -0.17 -1.32 0.01 0.00 4.05 -1.14 -0.26 -7.83 -1.28 -0.32 -5.99
-2 -0.97 -0.28 -2.30 -0.12 -0.04 3.94 -1.25 -0.29 -9.07 -2.37 -0.59 -8.36
-1 -0.58 -0.17 -2.88 -0.02 -0.01 3.92 -1.62 -0.37 -10.69 -0.76 -0.19 -9.12
0 0.11 0.03 -2.76 0.77 0.30 4.68 -1.24 -0.29 -11.94 0.04 0.01 -9.09
1 0.98 0.28 -1.79 0.93 0.36 5.61 -0.41 -0.09 -12.34 2.25 0.56 -6.84
2 0.88 0.25 -0.91 0.83 0.32 6.45 -0.66 -0.15 -13.00 2.28 0.57 -4.56
3 0.39 0.11 -0.52 0.36 0.14 6.80 -0.54 -0.13 -13.55 1.25 0.31 -3.30
4 0.84 0.24 0.32 0.82 0.32 7.62 -0.71 -0.16 -14.25 2.19 0.54 -1.11
5 0.65 0.19 0.96 0.88 0.34 8.50 0.11 0.03 -14.14 0.66 0.16 -0.44
6 0.99 0.29 1.95 0.92 0.35 9.42 -0.29 -0.07 -14.43 2.22 0.55 1.77
7 0.70 0.20 2.65 0.90 0.35 10.32 -0.72 -0.17 -15.15 1.53 0.38 3.31
8 0.87 0.25 3.52 0.68 0.26 11.00 -0.64 -0.15 -15.79 2.53 0.63 5.84
9 0.80 0.23 4.32 0.97 0.38 11.97 -0.52 -0.12 -16.31 1.61 0.40 7.45
10 0.93 0.27 5.25 0.77 0.30 12.74 -0.41 -0.10 -16.72 2.39 0.59 9.83
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Table 4-8. Abnormal returns for target restaurants and payment methods 
Total (n=80) Cash (n=53) Stock (n=10) Mixed (n=17) Event 
day AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR AR t CAR 
-10 1.51 0.45 1.51 1.85 0.50 1.85 1.39 0.54 1.39 0.53 0.19 0.53
-9 1.37 0.41 2.88 1.86 0.51 3.71 0.17 0.07 1.56 0.55 0.20 1.09
-8 1.07 0.32 3.95 1.42 0.39 5.13 0.11 0.04 1.67 0.53 0.19 1.62
-7 1.26 0.37 5.21 1.44 0.39 6.56 1.43 0.56 3.11 0.60 0.22 2.21
-6 1.53 0.45 6.74 2.09 0.57 8.65 1.54 0.60 4.65 -0.21 -0.08 2.00
-5 1.77 0.52 8.51 2.13 0.58 10.78 1.36 0.53 6.01 0.89 0.32 2.89
-4 1.67 0.50 10.18 2.00 0.54 12.78 1.52 0.59 7.53 0.76 0.28 3.65
-3 1.65 0.49 11.83 2.19 0.60 14.97 0.31 0.12 7.84 0.75 0.27 4.40
-2 1.45 0.43 13.28 1.60 0.44 16.57 1.66 0.65 9.50 0.84 0.31 5.24
-1 1.94 0.58 15.22 2.29 0.62 18.86 1.75 0.68 11.25 0.98 0.36 6.22
0 3.07 0.91 18.30 3.33 0.90 22.18 1.88 0.73 13.12 3.00 1.10 9.22
1 3.70 1.10 21.99 4.04 1.10 26.23 2.65 1.03 15.77 3.23 1.18 12.45
2 3.74 1.11 25.73 4.02 1.09 30.25 3.12 1.22 18.90 3.23 1.18 15.67
3 3.76 1.11 29.49 4.04 1.10 34.29 3.09 1.21 21.99 3.28 1.20 18.96
4 3.77 1.12 33.27 4.03 1.10 38.32 3.21 1.25 25.20 3.30 1.21 22.26
5 3.34 0.99 36.60 3.34 0.91 41.65 3.31 1.29 28.52 3.36 1.23 25.62
6 3.76 1.12 40.37 4.02 1.09 45.67 3.24 1.26 31.76 3.27 1.20 28.89
7 3.35 0.99 43.72 3.39 0.92 49.06 3.23 1.26 34.99 3.32 1.21 32.22
8 3.47 1.03 47.19 3.84 1.04 52.90 3.41 1.33 38.40 2.35 0.86 34.56
9 3.00 0.89 50.19 2.85 0.77 55.74 3.20 1.25 41.60 3.38 1.23 37.94
10 3.45 1.02 53.64 3.53 0.96 59.28 3.15 1.23 44.75 3.35 1.23 41.29
 
For the target restaurants, stocks showed positive AR on and following the 
announcement day (AR0 = 3.70). Overall, the stock market reacted favorably to merger 
and acquisition announcements for the target restaurants. In addition, the shareholders of 
target restaurants firms gained the most when the merger and acquisition deals were cash 
payment (CAR-10+10 = 59.28). The stock payment had a CAR-10+10 = 44.75 and the mixed 
payment had a CAR-10+10 = 41.29. The results are summarized in Table 4-8. 
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Figure 4-3 illustrates the AR and CAR for acquiring restaurant firms. In general, 
the AR of acquiring restaurant firms generally fluctuated around zero except when the 
payment was mixed. The mixed payment included cash, stock, and other types of 
payments. When the mixed payment was used in merger and acquisition transactions, the 
AR showed a stable increase since the announcement day. It appears that the stock 
market realized these stocks were undervalued since the merger and acquisition 
announcements were made. Generally, merger and acquisition transactions were 
positively absorbed by the stock market when they were paid by pure cash and they were 
tendered. On the other hand, they were negatively absorbed by the market when 
payments were made purely by stock.  
Figure 4-4 displays the AR and CAR for target restaurants firms. It is obvious that 
merger and acquisition announcements for the target restaurants were perceived quite 
positively by the stock market regardless of the mode of merger or method of payment. 
However, it reacted more positively to the announcements on and following the event day 
when the deals were tendered (as opposed to merged) and paid by pure cash (as opposed 
to pure stock and mixed payment).  
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Figure 4-3. AR and CAR for acquiring restaurants 
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Figure 4-4. AR and CAR for target restaurants 
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2. Accounting-Based Performance 
 
This study further investigated long-term post-acquisition performance of 
acquiring hospitality firms using accounting-based performance measures. ROA, ROE, 
and operating cash flow to assets ratio were used as profitability measures. In addition, 
sales to assets ratio was used to measure overall efficiency of acquiring hospitality firms. 
Finally, in order to assess acquiring hospitality firm’s growth, the year-to-year percentage 
change in sales was used.  
Descriptive statistics of accounting-based performance measures of acquiring 
hospitality firms are summarized in Table 4-9. Descriptive statistics show that ROA and 
ROE increased after acquisitions in both 3-year and 5-year performance measures. This 
phenomenon was more obvious in the restaurant industry. However, standard deviations 
of these measures are too big to conclude that acquisitions lead to increased profitability 
in the hospitality industry. On the other hand, a ratio of operating cash flow to assets, 
another profitability measure stays about the same following acquisitions. Similarly, the 
rate of sales to assets, the efficiency measure, did not change much after acquisitions. 
However, as seen in Table 4-9, the year-to-year percentage change in sales decreases 
after acquisitions, especially in the hotel industry.  
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Table 4-9. Descriptive statistics of accounting-based performance measures 
3 year  5 year 
All (n=14) Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Performance Measure Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Profitability ROA -0.64 19.79 4.59 5.93 0.48 14.53 4.68 5.82
 ROE -0.34 38.36 8.69 13.41 0.66 30.08 8.46 11.57
 Operating cash flow/Assets 10.93 10.89 12.18 6.61 12.22 6.43 12.24 6.69
Efficiency Sales/Assets 122.34 52.80 122.54 52.51 121.69 51.66 126.90 56.63
Growth Sales/Salest-1 28.11 64.03 12.88 13.02 21.05 42.36 9.58 9.26
Hotel (n=4)  
Performance Measure Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Profitability ROA 2.50 2.03 2.71 1.09 2.95 1.95 2.36 2.08
 ROE 13.58 13.48 10.76 2.45 11.53 13.02 7.60 6.92
 Operating cash flow/Assets 8.20 2.54 7.04 1.40 7.68 2.53 7.13 1.47
Efficiency Sales/Assets 78.00 43.21 68.12 30.74 83.69 52.61 69.83 31.37
Growth Sales/Salest-1 66.06 94.47 10.71 10.79 43.48 58.80 8.01 6.09
Restaurant (n=9)  
Performance Measure Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Profitability ROA -2.38 24.99 5.63 7.29 -0.89 18.30 5.97 6.91
 ROE -8.07 45.95 7.53 16.88 -5.38 35.65 8.94 13.89
 Operating cash flow/Assets 12.44 13.50 15.03 6.67 15.05 6.58 15.08 6.81
Efficiency Sales/Assets 146.98 41.04 152.77 33.61 142.80 39.37 158.60 39.40
Growth Sales/Salest-1 7.02 28.30 14.09 14.58 8.59 26.42 10.45 10.88
S.D.: Standard deviation 
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Figure 4-5. Pre- and post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms 
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While descriptive statistics suggest some differences between pre- and post-
acquisition performance in the hospitality industry, none of statistical tests identified 
significant differences between pre- and post-acquisition performance in both a pooled 
data set and the restaurant industries. However, it was found that the acquiring hotel 
firm’s growth rate lowered significantly following mergers and acquisitions in both 3-
year (Z= -2.02, p<.05) and 5-year tests (Z= -1.75, p<.10). Figure 4-5 illustrates pre- and 
post-acquisition accounting-based performance of acquiring hospitality firms. 
Additionally, the results of t-tests and Wilcoxon ranks tests are summarized in Table 4-
10. 
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Table 4-10. The results of t-tests and Wilcoxon ranks tests 
3 year  5 year 
All (n=14) Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Performance Measure M.D. S.D. t Z M.D. S.D. t Z 
Profitability ROA -5.22 21.27 -0.92 -0.28 -4.20 16.52 -0.95 -0.09
 ROE -9.02 42.79 -0.79 -0.03 -7.80 34.82 -0.84 -0.16
 Operating cash flow/Assets -1.25 9.87 -0.47 -0.35 -0.08 5.18 -0.06 -0.03
Efficiency Sales/Assets -0.19 29.65 -0.02 -0.28 -5.21 35.97 -0.54 -0.41
Growth Sales/Salest-1 15.23 68.35 0.83 -1.35 11.47 45.03 0.95 -1.54
Hotel (n=5)  
Performance Measure M.D. S.D. t Z M.D. S.D. t Z 
Profitability ROA -0.21 1.08 -0.43 -0.40 0.59 1.31 1.02 -1.21
 ROE 2.82 13.02 0.48 -0.13 3.92 11.20 0.78 -0.94
 Operating cash flow/Assets 1.16 2.86 0.91 -0.67 0.55 2.87 0.43 -0.40
Efficiency Sales/Assets 9.88 17.67 1.25 -0.94 13.86 24.82 1.25 -1.48
Growth Sales/Salest-1 55.34 94.83 1.30 -2.02** 35.47 58.34 1.36 -1.75*
Restaurant (n=9)  
Performance Measure M.D. S.D. t Z M.D. S.D. t Z 
Profitability ROA -8.01 26.65 -0.90 -0.06 -6.86 20.50 -1.00 -0.41
 ROE -15.61 52.48 -0.89 -0.18 -14.32 42.12 -1.02 -0.41
 Operating cash flow/Assets -2.59 12.19 -0.64 -0.06 -0.48 6.39 -0.21 -0.14
Efficiency Sales/Assets -5.79 34.26 -0.51 -0.30 -15.81 37.96 -1.25 -1.01
Growth Sales/Salest-1 -7.06 39.11 -0.54 -0.18 -1.86 32.14 -0.17 -0.41
M.D.: Mean difference / S.D.: Standard deviation 
* p<.10, ** p<.05 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
1. Summary and Implications 
 
Summary 
This study attempts to investigate short-term financial performance of both 
acquiring and acquired hospitality firms and long-term accounting-based performance of 
acquiring hospitality firms. As a result, this study provides an empirical illustration of 
post-acquisition performance in the hotel and restaurant industries, using mergers and 
acquisitions from 1980 to 2004. At the first stage of analysis, short-term post-acquisition 
performance of hospitality firms was analyzed using stock prices. At this stage, the mode 
of mergers and method of payment were taken into consideration. At the second stage of 
analysis, accounting-based performance measures including profitability, efficiency, and 
growth measures were adopted in order to assess long-term post-acquisition performance 
of acquiring hospitality firms. The summary of the empirical findings of this study is 
presented in the following sections. 
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Relationship between the mode of merger and performance 
Overall, it was found that merger and acquisition announcements have no impact 
on acquiring hospitality firms’ stock prices and insignificant positive impact on acquired 
firms’ stock prices, which was comparable to the majority of previous studies. When the 
mode of merger was taken into consideration, this study found that investors reacted 
favorably to tender offers compared to mergers, which was consistent with Canina (2001) 
and Loughran and Vijh (1997). This phenomenon was more prominent for target 
companies. This implies that the investors’ expectations regarding increased market 
power and efficiency (Canina, 2001).  
 
Relationship between the method of payment and performance 
Furthermore, this study considered the method of payment (i.e., cash, stock, and 
mixed payments) and each payment method was analyzed separately. The contrast 
between pure cash payment and pure stock payment was particularly sharp. The results 
exhibit that the merger and acquisition announcements in the hospitality industry were 
negatively absorbed by the stock market when they were paid by pure stock. Acquiring 
hospitality firms with stock financing showed negative abnormal returns in both the hotel 
(CAR-10+10 = -61.73) and restaurant (CAR-10+10 = -16.72) industries. Acquired hotels with 
stock payment also earned negative abnormal returns (CAR-10+10 = -63.86). Even though 
the acquired restaurants with stock payment earned positive abnormal returns (CAR-10+10 
= 44.75), it was smaller than the acquired restaurant with cash payment (CAR-10+10 = 
59.28). On the other hand, merger and acquisition announcements in the industry were 
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perceived positively when the payments were made by pure cash, which is consistent 
with Loughran and Vijh (1997).   
 
Impact of mergers and acquisitions on long-term performance 
As mentioned earlier, the ultimate goal of any merger or acquisition is to create 
synergy through economies of scale and scope. Accordingly, prior studies reported that 
enhancing profitability, efficiency, and growth are common objectives of mergers and 
acquisitions. While the results from financial performance exhibit little and insignificant 
wealth loss for acquiring company, there is a possibility that the effect of acquisitions 
appears slowly. Therefore, this study adopted accounting-based performance measures 
including profitability, efficiency, and growth measures in order to assess long-term post-
acquisition performance of acquiring hospitality firms. In particular, 3-year and 5-year 
pre-acquisition performance measures were compared to corresponding 3-year and 5-year 
acquisition performance measures, using t-tests and Wilcoxon ranks tests.  
Overall, the findings of this study does not support that acquiring hospitality firms 
achieved those objectives after acquisitions. While descriptive statistics indicated some 
differences between pre- and post-acquisition performance, statistical tests did not find 
any significant differences between pre- and post-acquisition performance in terms of 
profitability and efficiency. On the other hand, the growth rate of acquiring hotels, as 
measured by sales divided by the previous year value of sales, decreased significantly 
following mergers and acquisitions in both 3-year and 5-year tests.  
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Implications 
The findings of this study have both practical and theoretical implications that are 
useful for both practitioners and researchers. 
 
Practical implications 
The results of this study confirmed that market participants reacted favorably to 
tender offers compared to mergers. This implies that the investors believe that tender 
offers provide an opportunity to sell their stocks at a premium price. At the same time, it 
could be possible that the stock market feels more confidence about the performance of 
merged hospitality firms when merger and acquisition deals are tendered. At any event, 
market participants use a wide range of financial and non-financial information from 
internal and external sources when making decisions in order to maximize their gains and 
avoid losses. They can achieve their objectives by buying securities of target hospitality 
companies prior to tender offer announcements or buying right after them. This study 
also exhibited that the stock market reacted positively to acquisitions with cash payment 
and negatively to acquisitions with stock payment. Therefore, investors can assure their 
gains and avoid losses by selling prior to stock-financed acquisitions and buying prior to 
cash-financed acquisitions, or by selling right after stock-financed acquisition 
announcements and buying right after cash-financed acquisition announcements.  
One of the important issues facing the merged hospitality business units is to 
increase operational performance. However, this study did not find any improvement in 
operational performance of merged hospitality firms in terms of profitability, efficiency, 
and growth rate. Rather, the results indicated that the growth rate, as measured by year-
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to-year change of sales, decreased in the merged hotels. One can argue that the merged 
hospitality firms already achieved their growth goals through acquisitions and it is not 
surprising if their growth rates slow down. While this view has some possibility, it is still 
the utmost goal of mergers and acquisitions to create synergy by either creating 
efficiency or by eliminating inefficiency. Considering that the growth rate of this study 
was sales growth (not book-value or market-value of assets), it is concluded that the 
merged hospitality firms failed to create synergy after acquisitions. Thus, merger and 
acquisition practitioners should carefully design mergers and acquisitions so that merged 
firms are operationally successful. Furthermore, when designing mergers and 
acquisitions, practitioners should consider qualitative aspects such as organizational 
cultures as well. 
 
Theoretical implications 
This study is the first study that examined the relationship between post-
acquisition performance of hospitality firms and payment methods used for acquisitions. 
The results of this study revealed strong performance of cash acquisitions and weak 
performance of stock acquisitions. They are partly attributed to the perception of 
investors that the stock payment signals stock overvaluation, resulting in negative market 
reactions. This finding contributes to our body knowledge of the dynamics of hospitality 
acquisitions. While investigating informed trading prior to acquisitions of hospitality 
firms, Oak and Andrew (2006) also reported differences in the stock market’s reaction 
surrounding hospitality acquisition payment announcements in terms of ask-bid depth. 
Combining together, one can conclude that the reaction of the stock market is robustly 
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related to the acquisition payment methods used in the hospitality acquisitions. Therefore, 
it becomes necessary to include the payment methods used for acquisitions into merger 
and acquisition studies in the field of the hospitality.  
One can safely say that the ultimate goal of acquisition is to create synergy. In 
addition, Kim and Olsen (1999) documented that accelerating the acquiring company’s 
growth is the most important objective of lodging acquisitions. However, this study 
demonstrated that the acquiring hotel’s sales growth, in reality, lowered following 
acquisitions indicating a failure in creating synergy. This under-expected performance 
might be due to a matching problem between an acquirer and a target or insufficient 
preparation for organizational integration. In addition, this under-expected performance 
may arise because the true objective of hospitality acquisitions is not creating synergy or 
facilitating growth but others such as obtaining tax benefit, extending product lines 
(and/or markets), improving market power, and empire-building. It is also possible that a 
company acquire its competitor because the acquiring company notices business 
opportunities through the competitor’s brand name. In this case, the acquiring company 
maintains the brand name after the acquisition. As a matter of fact, corporate mergers and 
acquisitions often occur between competitors (i.e., horizontal merger), particularly in the 
early consolidation stage. Hospitality researchers need to discover the sources of this 
under-expected performance and how to overcome them.  
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2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research   
 
This study contributes to the merger and acquisition literature in the hospitality 
industry by utilizing recent data and incorporating both short-term financial performance 
and long-term accounting-based performance. Yet, there are several limitations that 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the findings of the current study.  
One limitation is related to other types of information available in the stock 
market except merger and acquisition announcements. This study investigates the 
relationship between merger and acquisition announcements and stock prices of 
hospitality firms. Ideally, event-window abnormal returns should reflect the isolated 
effect of acquisition announcements on acquiring and acquired firms’ stock prices. 
However, there could be other events that affect stock prices of the firms. Additionally, 
the relationship among different acquisition announcements is ignored in this study. That 
is, the stock market might react differently to an acquisition announcement if a major 
competitor just announced an acquisition.  
Another limitation of this study involves the small number of companies included 
in the study, which makes it difficult to generalize the findings of the study. For example, 
there were only two acquiring hotel firms involved in tendered transactions. It is hoped 
that further studies will overcome the sample size problem with the abundance of data. 
Given the complexity of the effects of mergers and acquisitions on performance of 
hospitality firms, studies with a large sample will provide meaningful insights into the 
dynamics of mergers and acquisitions in the hospitality industry.  
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Since evaluating the impact of mergers and acquisitions on a firm’s performance 
precisely is difficult, it is necessary to find the appropriate performance measures. While 
this study incorporates both market-based and accounting-based measures to assess post-
acquisition performance of hospitality firms, other types of performance measures such 
as market share and operational efficiencies were not included in this study. Future 
research integrating those performance measures will surely enhance our understanding 
concerning post-acquisition performance in the hospitality industry. For the hotel 
industry, for instance, average daily rate (ADR), occupancy rate, and revenue per 
available room (RevPAR) would be great performance indicators as well as market share. 
Including other types of measures such as market share and operating efficiencies could 
be one of the interesting future research areas in the hospitality industry. However, it is 
practically difficult to collect those data. Therefore, it is suggested that future research 
conduct close examinations on post-acquisition performance with small sample sizes. 
Finally, the scope of the study includes mergers and acquisitions in the hotel and 
restaurant industries. Future studies with an extended scope would advance our 
understanding regarding dynamics of mergers and acquisitions in hospitality-related areas 
such as the gaming industry, theme parks, airlines, and other recreational services.  
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Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective Company  
Transaction 
Value 
($mil) 
Tender 
Offer Payment 
12/9/1983 3/30/1984 Holiday Inns Inc 111.0 No Mixed 
2/16/1984 4/12/1984 Elsinore Corp 58.0 No Mixed 
7/5/1984 7/5/1984 Golden Nugget Inc 100.0 No Mixed 
8/16/1985 9/26/1985 Resorts International Inc 97.3 No Cash 
9/24/1985 11/25/1985 Prime Motor Inns Inc 235.0 No Mixed 
11/15/1985 4/25/1986 Bally Manufacturing Corp 564.5 Yes Mixed 
5/7/1986 8/4/1986 Marriott Corp 500.5 Yes Cash 
5/23/1988 12/30/1988 Golden Nugget Inc 40.0 No Cash 
6/22/1988 11/10/1988 ITT Corp 71.0 No Cash 
8/23/1988 12/1/1988 Sahara Casino Partners LP 112.5 No Cash 
10/15/1991 1/21/1992 CUC International Inc 266.0 No Stock 
10/5/1992 1/26/1993 Mirage Resorts Inc 70.0 No Cash 
1/26/1995 4/3/1995 Showboat Inc 25.0 No Cash 
3/20/1995 6/1/1995 Circus Circus Enterprises Inc 608.5 No Mixed 
6/15/1995 7/3/1995 La Quinta Inns Inc 189.3 No Mixed 
7/6/1995 11/30/1995 Grand Casinos Inc 139.2 No Stock 
8/19/1996 12/16/1996 Sun International Hotels Ltd 309.6 No Mixed 
10/1/1996 11/27/1996 Hudson Hotels Corp 60.2 No Mixed 
1/17/1997 4/11/1997 Extended Stay America Inc 295.9 No Stock 
2/4/1997 3/14/1997 Suburban Lodges of America Inc 23.0 No Stock 
3/18/1997 6/21/1997 Host Marriott Corp 540.0 No Mixed 
5/15/1997 5/15/1997 Signature Resorts Inc 59.4 No Stock 
7/25/1997 12/1/1997 Prime Hospitality Corp 133.2 No Stock 
9/2/1997 12/19/1997 Promus Hotel Corp 1703.6 No Stock 
7/1/1998 7/1/1998 Sonesta International Hotels 33.2 No Mixed 
9/23/1998 9/23/1998 Amerihost Properties Inc 37.0 No Mixed 
3/16/1999 10/14/1999 Hollywood Casino Corp 40.3 No Cash 
4/27/1999 12/30/1999 Park Place Entertainment Corp 3000.0 No Cash 
7/19/1999 10/1/1999 Starwood Hotel & Resorts 406.1 No Mixed 
9/7/1999 12/1/1999 Hilton Hotels Corp 3642.7 No Mixed 
10/6/1999 3/2/2000 Isle of Capri Casinos Inc 235.6 No Mixed 
12/17/1999 1/4/2000 Cavanaughs Hospitality Corp 61.4 No Cash 
3/16/2000 3/16/2000 Marriott International Inc 73.0 No Cash 
10/18/2001 1/2/2002 WestCoast Hospitality Corp 50.6 No Mixed 
5/2/2002 7/31/2002 MeriStar Hotels & Resorts Inc 78.7 No Stock 
12/5/2003 5/3/2004 Sands Regent 37.9 No Mixed 
3/3/2004 3/3/2004 Starwood Hotel & Resorts 40.0 No Cash 
7/15/2004 9/3/2004 La Quinta Corp 412.0 No Cash 
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Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective Company  
Transaction 
Value 
($mil) 
Tender 
Offer Payment 
4/22/1983 4/22/1983 Bally's Park Place Inc 286.3 No Mixed 
8/17/1983 8/17/1983 Hilton Hotels Corp 70.0 No Mixed 
8/1/1984 9/18/1984 American Motor Inns Inc 216.0 Yes Mixed 
11/15/1985 4/25/1986 MGM Grand Hotels Inc 564.5 Yes Mixed 
11/25/1985 12/30/1985 Servico Inc 54.4 No Cash 
9/26/1986 9/26/1986 Holiday Corp 63.3 No Cash 
10/19/1987 12/30/1987 Northview Corp 60.0 Yes Cash 
3/17/1988 11/15/1988 Resorts International Inc 1013.5 Yes Mixed 
7/11/1988 4/25/1989 Servico Inc 79.8 No Cash 
11/15/1988 4/19/1989 Princeville Corp 70.0 Yes Cash 
4/27/1989 5/8/1989 Hilton Hotels Corp 165.0 No Cash 
5/9/1989 5/22/1989 ITT Corp 700.0 No Cash 
7/12/1990 9/17/1990 Motel 6 LP 2300.0 Yes Mixed 
7/19/1990 12/27/1990 Caesars New Jersey Inc 48.4 Yes Cash 
10/18/1993 1/24/1994 La Quinta Motor Inns LP 46.4 Yes Cash 
11/4/1994 1/29/1995 United Inns 66.6 Yes Cash 
4/5/1995 8/2/1995 Club Med Inc 153.4 Yes Cash 
1/24/1996 8/8/1996 National Lodging Corp 57.0 No Cash 
3/20/1996 7/1/1997 Boomtown Inc 183.5 No Mixed 
6/6/1996 12/18/1996 Bally Entertainment Corp 3138.1 No Mixed 
1/17/1997 4/11/1997 Studio Plus Hotels Inc 295.9 No Stock 
4/14/1997 1/5/1998 Wyndham Hotel Corp 773.1 No Mixed 
5/27/1997 12/18/1997 HFS Inc 11342.9 No Stock 
9/2/1997 12/19/1997 Doubletree Corp 1703.6 No Stock 
10/20/1997 2/24/1998 ITT Corp 13748.2 No Mixed 
11/13/1997 3/25/1998 Chartwell Leisure Inc 240.8 No Cash 
12/2/1997 6/2/1998 Interstate Hotels Co 2055.9 No Mixed 
12/19/1997 1/20/1998 Showboat Inc 1147.6 No Mixed 
12/31/1997 5/22/1998 Red Lion Inns LP 276.0 No Mixed 
1/5/1998 7/17/1998 La Quinta Inns Inc 2907.5 No Mixed 
3/23/1998 7/28/1998 Bristol Hotel Co 1793.2 No Mixed 
6/29/1998 12/31/1998 Grand Casinos Inc 832.4 No Mixed 
8/10/1998 1/4/1999 Rio Hotel & Casino Inc 821.9 No Mixed 
11/9/1998 3/1/1999 Primadonna Resorts Inc 268.4 No Stock 
6/11/1999 10/26/1999 Supertel Hospitality Inc 52.8 No Stock 
7/12/1999 8/13/1999 Red Roof Inns Inc 1128.1 Yes Mixed 
7/19/1999 10/1/1999 Vistana Inc 406.1 No Mixed 
9/7/1999 12/1/1999 Promus Hotel Corp 3642.7 No Mixed 
10/6/1999 3/2/2000 Lady Luck Gaming Corp 235.6 No Mixed 
2/22/2000 5/31/2000 Mirage Resorts Inc 6483.3 No Mixed 
2/28/2000 4/30/2000 Bristol Hotels & Resorts Inc 152.5 Yes Cash 
3/23/2000 6/8/2000 Homestead Village Inc 156.8 Yes Cash 
9/19/2000 11/30/2000 US Franchise Systems Inc 100.2 Yes Cash 
9/21/2000 1/5/2001 Sunburst Hospitality Corp 120.8 No Cash 
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Announced 
Date 
Effective Company  
Transaction 
Value 
($mil) 
Tender 
Offer Payment 
4/27/2001 2/22/2002 Black Hawk Gaming & Dvlp Co 36.3 No Cash 
1/29/2002 5/1/2002 Suburban Lodges of America Inc 109.8 No Cash 
3/27/2002 6/7/2002 Crestline Capital Corp 570.2 No Cash 
4/1/2002 6/3/2002 Trendwest Resorts 987.2 No Mixed 
8/7/2002 3/3/2003 Hollywood Casino Corp 916.5 No Mixed 
3/5/2004 5/12/2004 Extended Stay America Inc 2066.0 No Cash 
6/4/2004 4/25/2005 Mandalay Resort Group 7811.2 No Mixed 
7/15/2004 6/13/2005 Caesars Entertainment Inc 6332.3 No Mixed 
8/18/2004 10/8/2004 Prime Hospitality Corp 570.2 No Cash 
4/27/2001 2/22/2002 Black Hawk Gaming & Dvlp Co 36.3 No Cash 
1/29/2002 5/1/2002 Suburban Lodges of America Inc 109.8 No Cash 
3/27/2002 6/7/2002 Crestline Capital Corp 570.2 No Cash 
4/1/2002 6/3/2002 Trendwest Resorts 987.2 No Mixed 
8/7/2002 3/3/2003 Hollywood Casino Corp 916.5 No Mixed 
3/5/2004 5/12/2004 Extended Stay America Inc 2066.0 No Cash 
6/4/2004 4/25/2005 Mandalay Resort Group 7811.2 No Mixed 
7/15/2004 6/13/2005 Caesars Entertainment Inc 6332.3 No Mixed 
8/18/2004 10/8/2004 Prime Hospitality Corp 570.2 No Cash 
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Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective Company  
Transaction 
Value 
($mil) 
Tender 
Offer Payment 
1/22/1982 5/27/1982 Pillsbury Co 43.4 No Mixed 
6/28/1983 7/28/1983 Saga Corp 66.0 No Mixed 
9/12/1983 12/29/1983 Godfather's Pizza Inc 317.3 No Mixed 
11/21/1983 2/22/1984 VICORP Restaurants Inc 65.0 No Mixed 
11/23/1983 11/23/1983 Restaurant Associates Inds Inc 17.3 No Mixed 
12/14/1984 10/16/1985 LLC Corp 76.5 No Stock 
1/10/1985 5/28/1985 Taco Villa Inc(WR Grace & Co) 48.0 No Stock 
5/14/1985 7/9/1985 Sizzler Restaurants Intl Inc 20.0 No Cash 
5/21/1985 8/7/1985 Pillsbury Co 361.0 Yes Cash 
9/18/1985 12/30/1985 Wendys International Inc 43.0 Yes Stock 
5/27/1986 5/27/1986 National Pizza Co 14.0 No Cash 
2/6/1987 7/30/1987 Pantera's Corp 61.5 No Mixed 
3/30/1987 3/30/1987 Morrison Inc 15.1 No Cash 
3/21/1988 9/14/1988 TPI Enterprises Inc 123.0 Yes Cash 
9/29/1988 12/29/1989 Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc 33.0 No Cash 
2/28/1989 2/28/1989 Chilis Inc 17.9 No Stock 
3/10/1989 4/25/1991 Collins Foods International 122.0 Yes Stock 
3/17/1989 5/17/1989 Famous Restaurants Inc 23.0 No Cash 
7/27/1989 11/26/1989 National Pizza Co 29.6 Yes Cash 
3/4/1991 7/1/1991 ELXSI Corp 22.0 No Cash 
3/26/1992 6/15/1992 Rally's Hamburger 12.0 No Cash 
5/18/1993 6/10/1993 National Pizza Co 20.0 No Cash 
7/26/1993 9/9/1993 Checkers Drive-In Restaurants 12.3 No Stock 
10/19/1993 12/28/1993 Main Street and Main Inc 42.0 No Stock 
3/15/1994 6/3/1994 Starbucks Corp 26.0 No Stock 
3/23/1994 4/29/2004 Capucino's Inc 73.5 No Stock 
4/20/1994 4/20/1994 Outback Steakhouse Inc 19.6 No Stock 
7/5/1994 7/5/1994 Billy Blues Food Corp 24.9 No Stock 
7/14/1994 9/26/1994 DavCo Restaurants Inc 18.4 No Mixed 
10/14/1994 3/23/1995 Applebees International Inc 63.7 No Mixed 
11/10/1994 1/17/1995 Morrison Restaurants Inc 23.0 No Mixed 
7/20/1995 8/29/1995 Brinker International Inc 72.5 No Stock 
8/15/1995 11/17/1995 Apple South Inc 207.1 No Stock 
9/5/1995 9/9/1996 Shoney's Inc 160.1 No Mixed 
9/18/1995 10/17/1995 Lone Star Steakhouse,Saloon 23.0 No Cash 
2/22/1996 6/7/1996 Quality Dining Inc 110.2 No Stock 
4/19/1996 8/9/1996 Landry's Seafood Restaurants 74.1 No Mixed 
6/3/1996 7/4/1996 Denamerica Corp 65.0 No Cash 
6/4/1996 9/20/1996 Buffets Inc 174.0 No Stock 
6/14/1996 9/13/1996 Longhorn Steaks Inc 48.5 No Stock 
7/10/1996 11/22/1996 Wendys International Inc 28.0 No Cash 
7/15/1996 9/30/1996 Luby's Cafeterias Inc 14.8 No Cash 
8/2/1996 8/30/1996 McDonald's Corp 74.0 No Cash 
3/27/1997 5/22/1997 Triarc Cos Inc 300.0 No Cash 
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($mil) 
Tender 
Offer Payment 
5/2/1997 7/3/1997 Casa Ole Restaurants Inc 11.6 No Mixed 
7/23/1997 12/2/1997 Benihana Inc 18.8 No Cash 
8/15/1997 11/21/1997 Eateries Inc 10.2 No Cash 
8/28/1997 8/28/1997 Fine Host Corp 26.5 No Mixed 
10/30/1997 7/15/1998 Boston Chicken Inc 181.0 No Mixed 
12/23/1997 3/25/1998 Applebees International Inc 93.4 No Cash 
1/15/1998 4/2/1998 CKE Restaurants Inc 426.4 No Mixed 
4/23/1998 7/31/1998 Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc 46.2 Yes Cash 
7/29/1998 11/25/1998 New World Coffee & Bagels Inc 20.0 No Mixed 
11/30/1998 10/1/1999 Nathan's Famous Inc 14.0 No Mixed 
12/11/1998 2/16/1999 Cracker Barrel Old Country Str 178.3 No Cash 
1/29/1999 8/9/1999 Checkers Drive-In Restaurants 35.8 No Stock 
5/10/1999 7/14/1999 Morgan's Foods Inc 33.7 No Cash 
6/25/1999 7/28/1999 CEC Entertainment Inc 19.0 No Cash 
11/5/1999 11/30/1999 Creative Host Services Inc 20.0 No Cash 
11/22/1999 11/22/1999 Starbucks Corp 10.0 No Cash 
5/24/2000 8/30/2000 Sizzler International Inc 19.1 No Mixed 
9/26/2000 12/1/2000 Landry's Seafood Restaurants 70.8 Yes Cash 
11/20/2000 4/12/2001 Brinker International Inc 93.0 No Cash 
11/19/2001 3/1/2002 CKE Restaurants Inc 72.4 No Stock 
12/17/2001 1/15/2002 Buca Inc 18.0 No Cash 
1/16/2002 5/17/2002 Darden Restaurants Inc 10.5 No Cash 
3/12/2002 5/7/2002 Tricon Global Restaurants 320.0 No Cash 
5/31/2002 6/21/2002 Wendys International Inc 275.0 No Cash 
7/16/2002 11/7/2002 Applebees International Inc 32.8 No Cash 
9/11/2002 10/4/2002 Landry's Restaurants Inc 75.0 No Cash 
10/28/2002 1/28/2003 O Charleys Inc 160.7 No Mixed 
11/13/2002 12/4/2002 Benihana Inc 12.2 No Mixed 
1/21/2003 1/21/2003 Jack in the Box Inc 45.0 No Cash 
4/16/2003 7/14/2003 Starbucks Corp 72.0 No Cash 
9/26/2003 1/8/2004 Mexican Restaurants Inc 13.8 No Cash 
6/14/2004 7/7/2004 Bob Evans Farms Inc 182.0 No Mixed 
6/28/2004 7/22/2004 Triarc Cos Inc 86.5 No Cash 
9/3/2004 9/22/2004 Outback Steakhouse Inc 42.5 No Cash 
11/5/2004 12/29/2004 Steak n Shake Co 20.5 No Cash 
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Date 
Announced 
Date 
Effective Company  
Transaction 
Value 
($mil) 
Tender 
Offer Payment 
11/20/1981 3/3/1982 Host International inc 152.4 No Mixed 
9/12/1983 12/29/1983 Chart House Inc 317.3 No Mixed 
1/29/1984 1/29/1984 Denny's Inc 734.2 No Cash 
9/12/1984 12/19/1984 ARA Services Inc 921.4 No Mixed 
5/21/1985 8/7/1985 Diversifoods Inc 361.0 Yes Cash 
12/5/1985 10/15/1986 A&M Food Services Inc 43.9 No Stock 
5/7/1986 8/4/1986 Saga Corp 500.5 Yes Cash 
5/9/1986 12/30/1986 El Torito Restaurants Inc 62.5 Yes Cash 
9/25/1986 12/22/1986 Carrols Corp 88.0 No Cash 
11/3/1986 7/23/1987 Nathan's Famous Inc 20.7 No Cash 
11/3/1986 12/31/1986 Pasquale Food Inc 164.7 Yes Cash 
11/21/1986 9/9/1987 Ponderosa Inc 282.0 Yes Cash 
2/6/1987 7/30/1987 Pizza Inn Inc 61.5 No Mixed 
2/16/1987 3/2/1988 Calny Inc 52.0 No Cash 
8/25/1987 3/4/1988 Restaurant Associates Inds Inc 58.8 Yes Cash 
9/22/1987 11/23/1987 Rusty Pelican Restaurants Inc 46.1 No Mixed 
12/22/1987 5/12/1988 Hamburger Hamlets Inc 29.2 No Cash 
2/5/1988 10/27/1988 International King's Table Inc 47.0 Yes Cash 
2/22/1988 4/13/1988 Chi-Chi's Inc 265.9 Yes Cash 
3/21/1988 9/14/1988 Shoney's South Inc 123.0 Yes Cash 
5/12/1988 10/31/1988 Restaurant Management Services 47.3 No Cash 
7/25/1988 11/23/1988 Fuddruckers Inc 11.7 No Stock 
8/29/1988 12/9/1988 Foodmaker Inc 474.8 Yes Mixed 
10/4/1988 1/10/1989 Pillsbury Co 5757.9 Yes Cash 
10/13/1988 1/4/1989 Associated Hosts Inc 22.0 Yes Cash 
10/24/1988 9/21/1989 Church's Fried Chicken Inc 395.7 Yes Mixed 
3/10/1989 4/25/1991 Sizzler Restaurants Intl Inc 122.0 Yes Stock 
5/12/1989 12/15/1989 McDonald's Corp 300.0 No Cash 
5/19/1989 2/21/1990 TGI Friday's Inc 52.7 No Cash 
8/7/1989 5/21/1990 Jerrico Inc 607.0 Yes Mixed 
8/30/1989 10/18/1989 USACafes LP 70.2 No Cash 
11/17/1989 1/3/1990 Dunkin' Donuts Inc 304.6 Yes Cash 
5/6/1992 9/30/1992 Showbiz Pizza Time Inc 10.7 No Cash 
6/25/1992 11/17/1992 TW Holdings Inc 450.0 No Mixed 
1/3/1994 1/3/1994 Au Bon Pain Co Inc 30.0 No Cash 
1/24/1994 5/18/1994 On The Border Cafes Inc 30.8 No Stock 
8/24/1994 10/24/1994 Rally's Hamburgers Inc 10.0 No Cash 
8/15/1995 11/17/1995 DF&R Restaurants Inc 207.1 No Stock 
9/5/1995 9/9/1996 TPI Enterprises Inc 160.1 No Mixed 
1/11/1996 7/30/1996 Golf Enterprises Inc 82.9 No Mixed 
6/4/1996 9/20/1996 HomeTown Buffet Inc 174.0 No Stock 
6/14/1996 9/13/1996 Bugaboo Creek Steak House Inc 48.5 No Stock 
5/23/1997 5/23/1997 Chart House Enterprises Inc 19.6 No Cash 
5/28/1997 7/17/1997 DAKA International Inc 194.0 Yes Mixed 
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Tender 
Offer Payment 
7/23/1997 12/2/1997 Rudy's Restaurant Group 18.8 No Cash 
8/4/1997 12/23/1997 Perkins Family Restaurant LP 76.3 No Cash 
9/2/1997 12/3/1997 Ground Round Restaurants Inc 17.5 Yes Cash 
9/5/1997 4/3/1998 DavCo Restaurants Inc 133.6 No Cash 
9/23/1997 1/22/1998 El Chico Restaurants Inc 49.2 No Cash 
9/26/1997 2/3/1998 Sagebrush Inc 39.4 No Stock 
4/3/1998 7/21/1998 Bertucci's Inc 96.5 Yes Cash 
4/23/1998 7/31/1998 Morrison Restaurants Inc 46.2 Yes Cash 
6/4/1998 7/20/1998 Pollo Tropical Inc 94.6 Yes Cash 
6/10/1998 10/30/1998 Koo Koo Roo Inc 158.0 No Mixed 
9/18/1998 1/25/1999 Spaghetti Warehouse 54.3 No Mixed 
11/25/1998 9/29/1999 Sbarro Inc 386.4 No Cash 
11/30/1998 10/1/1999 Miami Subs Corp 14.0 No Mixed 
12/3/1998 4/5/1999 Back Bay Restaurants Group Inc 38.9 No Cash 
12/11/1998 2/16/1999 Logans Roadhouse Inc 178.3 No Cash 
1/29/1999 8/9/1999 Rally's Hamburgers Inc 35.8 No Stock 
2/9/1999 7/8/1999 Coffee People Inc 31.7 No Mixed 
3/19/1999 8/13/1999 Rock Bottom Restaurants Inc 58.5 No Cash 
7/26/1999 9/2/1999 Host Marriott Services 547.3 Yes Cash 
6/5/2000 9/28/2000 Buffets Inc 646.8 No Cash 
9/26/2000 12/1/2000 Rainforest Cafe Inc 70.8 Yes Cash 
10/6/2000 12/20/2000 Taco Cabana Inc 151.4 No Mixed 
10/25/2000 7/31/2001 Uno Restaurant Corp 45.4 Yes Cash 
11/16/2000 7/17/2001 Il Fornaio America Corp 77.3 No Cash 
12/14/2000 8/31/2001 NPC International Inc 93.6 No Cash 
1/25/2001 6/20/2001 Sodexho Marriott Services Inc 1144.5 Yes Cash 
2/6/2001 4/5/2001 Morrison Management Specialist 572.9 Yes Cash 
2/15/2001 5/14/2001 VICORP Restaurants Inc 178.8 No Cash 
3/9/2001 3/9/2001 Luby's Inc 10.0 No Cash 
3/23/2001 8/31/2001 PJ America Inc 22.7 Yes Cash 
10/8/2001 1/24/2002 Blimpie International Inc 25.8 No Cash 
11/19/2001 3/1/2002 Santa Barbara Restaurant Group 72.4 No Stock 
5/21/2002 7/25/2002 Morton's Restaurant Group Inc 71.1 No Cash 
9/30/2003 3/10/2004 Garden Fresh Restaurant Corp 103.0 No Cash 
2/18/2004 4/16/2004 Creative Host Services Inc 33.1 Yes Cash 
6/15/2004 4/13/2005 Quality Dining Inc 21.1 No Cash 
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